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Cover: Washington County, Maryland
President Abraham Lincoln after the battle at Antietam, October 1862. (Maryland Historical Society.)

The Maryland Historical Magazine welcomes submissions from authors and letters to the editor. Letters may be edited for space and clarity. All articles will be acknowledged, but only those accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope will be returned. Submissions should be printed or typed manuscript. Address Editor, Maryland Historical Magazine, 201 West Monument Street, Baltimore, Maryland, 21201. Include name, address, and daytime telephone number. Once accepted, articles should be on CDS (MS Word or PC convertible format), or may be emailed to panderson@mdhs.org. The guidelines for contributors are available on our website at www.mdhs.org.
In this Issue . . .

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by Scott S. Sheads

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by David Head

Landscape and Politics:
The Creation of Baltimore’s Druid Hill Park, 1860
by David Schley
Call for Papers: Society for the Historians of the Early American Republic

Whither the Revolution: How the Early Republic Retained and Remolded the Legacy of the Revolution,” the 31st annual meeting of the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic will be held July 16-19, 2009, in Springfield, Illinois. For the bicentennial of Abraham Lincoln’s birth, the program committee, mindful of Lincoln’s role in interpreting and reinterpreting the nation’s founding, has determined to seek explorations about the fate of the Revolutionary inheritance in the early republic. The years of Lincoln’s rise to political prominence focused attention specifically on the meaning of the founding generation’s legacy. It would be appropriate to assess the power of the Revolution to mold the expectations and directions of the next three generations of Americans. In the varied areas of America life—political, social, intellectual and economic—scholars should define where the Revolutionary tradition was sustained, where it was modified, and where it was replaced. One of the many understandings that might result from such an enterprise is determining whether Lincoln maintained, modified, or replaced the Revolutionary heritage. Although the program committee is seeking sessions on the inheritance of the Revolution in the age of Lincoln, its members in no sense want to discourage scholars from presenting the results of their research on other topics in the history of the early republic.

The Program Committee welcomes the submission of individual papers and full sessions; it as well invites sessions employing formats other than presentation of papers. Proposals should include a brief abstract for the panel/session (maximum 600 words) as well as an abstract for each paper (maximum 300 words) and a brief (maximum one page) vita for each participant, including chairs and commentators. Every session proposal must include a single coversheet that lists for every participant a complete and updated mailing address, email, phone number, and current affiliation. All interested participants are encouraged to send their submissions by email attachments; the format can be in MS Word, WordPerfect, or pdf (Adobe Acrobat). Please note that all program participants must be members of SHEAR or register at the nonmember fee. The deadline for submissions is December 1, 2008. Send submissions to: Professor Jim Huston, Chair, SHEAR Program Committee, History Department, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078-3054, email: james.huston@okstate.edu.
2008 Joseph L. Arnold Prize

for Outstanding Writing on Baltimore History

Submission Deadline:
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Presented by the Baltimore City Historical Society

The Baltimore City Historical Society presents an annual Joseph L. Arnold Prize for Outstanding Writing on Baltimore’s History, in the amount of $500.

Joseph L. Arnold, Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, died in 2004, at the age of sixty-six. He was a vital and enormously important member of the UMBC faculty for some three and a half decades as well as a leading historian of urban and planning history. He also played an active and often leading role with a variety of private and public historical institutions in the Baltimore area and at his death was hailed as the “dean of Baltimore historians.”

Entries for the 2008 Joseph L. Arnold Prize should be unpublished manuscripts between 15 and 45 double-spaced pages in length (including footnotes/endnotes). Entries should be submitted via email as attachments in MS Word or PC convertible format. If illustrations are to be included they must be submitted along with the text in either J-peg or TIF formation. Entries must be submitted to by February 1, 2009.

Criteria for selection are: significance, originality, quality of research and clarity of presentation. The winner will be announced in Spring, 2009. The BCHS reserves the right to not to award the prize. The winning entry will be considered for publication in the Maryland Historical Magazine.

Further inquiries may be addressed to: baltimorehistory@law.umaryland.edu or call Myra Hickman at 410-706-6814.
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Baltimore Seafarers, Privateering, and the South American Revolutions, 1816–1820

David Head

In Buenos Aires, on February 22, 1818, a group of American merchants, diplomats, and sea captains gathered to celebrate George Washington’s birthday. The festivities took place during the height of the South American revolutions against Spain and the celebrants offered toasts that highlighted the common cause of the United States and South America in their pursuits of independence. John Dieter, a Baltimore sea captain, hailed “the Patriots of North and South America,” and Job Wheeden, a ship’s surgeon, raised a glass to “the heroes who have fought, bled, and died in their country’s cause.” These Americans, however, were more than well-wishers. Many of those gathered on this occasion—including Dieter and Wheeden, as well as the event’s organizers—worked as Buenos Airean privateers. By fitting out vessels and accepting commissions from a revolutionary government to attack Spanish shipping, these Americans became participants in the revolutions.

Like other South American colonies at the time, Buenos Aires (the future Argentina) had been mired in political crisis for nearly a decade, ever since Napoleon invaded Spain, overthrew the Spanish monarchy, and installed his brother as king. Each colony moved towards independence in its own way, with the sides often blurred. South American Patriots not only fought Royalists from Spain and from South America, but they fought each other as well. Yet, as long as Spain fought the French at home, South America enjoyed a measure of autonomy. The balance of power changed in 1814 when the Spanish forced Napoleon off the peninsula and restored King Ferdinand VII to the throne. The monarch moved quickly to regain his American possessions. By early 1815 the largest Spanish expedition ever assembled set sail. Those revolutionary leaders who had not sought outside help soon began to do so.

South American revolutionaries found avid support in American sea ports, from New York to Philadelphia, Charleston, and Savannah. Two ports, however, outstripped all the others. New Orleans, where French and American sailors privateered for Cartagena (modern day Colombia) and Mexico, and Baltimore, where South American independence had long been popular and privateering, with its legacy in the American Revolution, had been a major industry during the

The author is completing his dissertation at the State University of New York at Buffalo. This essay won the 2008 Marion Brewington Prize.

recently-concluded War of 1812. Soon, Baltimore sailors and sea captains could be seen leaving port aboard privateers of Buenos Aires, Venezuela, and the Oriental Republic (now Uruguay). Between 1816, when the first South American agents arrived to distribute commissions, and 1820, when new laws, better law enforcement, and declining economic conditions forced South American vessels out of the Chesapeake, the city’s docks, counting houses, and courts bustled with the activities of the more than forty South American privateers who plied their trade through Baltimore.3

Nearly seventy years ago, Charles C. Griffin published an article that has since been the standard account of Baltimore’s role in South American privateering. In it, he portrayed the episode as an unsavory epilogue to the War of 1812. The war’s end brought a painful period of readjustment to city maritime industries that had long thrived on neutral-trading, blockade-running, and privateering in the war-torn decades of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. With no one else to fight, and with economic opportunities quickly moving elsewhere, the unemployed sailors, out-of-work sea captains, and languishing merchant houses of Baltimore looked to South American privateering as a quick way to fix their cash-flow problems. More recently Rafe Blaufarb, Peter Earle, Jerome Garitee, Robert Richie, and David Starkey have reached similar conclusions, arguing that the disintegration of Spain’s empire unleashed the kind of chaos that unscrupulous seafarers, always aching for just such an opportunity, thrived on for ill-gotten gains.4

Baltimore did experience economic difficulties after the War of 1812, although in the year following the war’s end Baltimoreans expected a bright future and migrants flocked to the city. Still, the long-term circumstances quickly became clear. With an Atlantic world at peace for the first time in a generation, trade routes adjusted in unfamiliar ways, and European carriers encroached on Baltimore’s shipping. Furthermore, many of the men who accepted South American commissions were veterans of privateering for the United States against Britain. Finally, they broke the law by engaging in this enterprise. According to the neutrality laws of the United States, enacted in 1794 and 1797, no American was allowed to own, fit out, arm, supply, command, sail aboard, or ship hands to sail aboard any foreign warship that intended to commit hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States, and no one, regardless of citizenship, was allowed to fit out, arm, or supply such a vessel in U.S. territory. Violators faced fines up to $10,000 and as many as ten years in jail. Additionally, per the terms of the nation’s 1795 treaty with Spain (known as Pinkney’s Treaty or the Treaty of San Lorenzo), the U.S. agreed to treat as pirates anyone who violated American neutrality to attack Spain. Piracy carried a punishment of death. Given these facts it may seem as though greed and desperation are sufficient explanations of Baltimore’s South American privateering.5 Yet, the sea captains, merchants, and diplomats who celebrated Washington’s birthday with encomiums to the liberty of North and South America, suggests the presence of other factors.
Operating on the edge of legality, South American privateers in Baltimore regularly ended up in court, answering both civil law suits and facing criminal charges. When these cases are combined with personal papers, newspapers, and diplomatic correspondence, it is possible to reconstruct many key parts of the business. Examining how investors financed vessels, how they evaded the law, why people chose to get involved, and how they were stopped reveals that these privateers did not fit the category of simple criminals. Indeed, South American privateering from Baltimore, a highly-organized business, attracted the mainstream of the marine community. Success depended on novel evasions of the law that challenged America’s policy of neutrality, and the work attracted participants with a variety of motives. Many of the men identified with South American independence sought their own material gains, often at the same time.

**Financing**

Preparing a privateer for sea was complex, time-consuming, and, above all, expensive. A fully-equipped vessel with new sails and spars, a full complement of cannon, small arms, swords, and stinkpots, and dozens of men who liked to eat and drink every day all made privateer ownership a capital intensive venture. In his study of War of 1812 privateering from Baltimore, Jerome Garitee estimated that the typical privateer in that conflict cost $40,000 when fully equipped, armed, and provisioned. Given that the Fourth of July and the New Republicana, the only South American privateers for which figures are available, required investments of $38,500 and $35,000 respectively, Garitee’s figure seems a reasonable benchmark.6

Few Baltimoreans, then, had the resources for such an expensive venture. In 1810, just 3,500 people in the city’s population of 46,000 had assets of at least $4,000 and approximately four hundred counted wealth of $15,000 or more. Privateering attracted those with property to risk and therefore eliminated laborers, sailors, mechanics, small farmers, or any of the thousands of others who made up the ranks of the working poor.7

Raising capital was only part of the challenge. Getting a South American privateering venture onto the water from Baltimore required the services of a network of commercial men on two continents. Managing partners known as armadores secured commissions from revolutionary governments, posted bond to guarantee good behavior, and distributed prize money won from vessels sent into port for condemnation. Investors put up the required funds, and middlemen connected the two by distributing commissions in the north, protecting their interests as agents, and occasionally providing financial services such as redeeming their notes, holding prize shares, and, on one occasion, providing insurance. Naturally, everyone involved took a cut of the prize money—one did not need to invest to gain.8

The appendix to this article lists those men who stood to benefit financially
from Baltimore’s South American privateering business and most likely underestimates the full scope of participation as the illegal nature of the enterprise inhibits discovering the identities of all of the participants. The federal district attorney and the Spanish consul, along with his Portuguese, British, and French counterparts, managed to unearth the names of twenty-four Baltimoreans who owned a share in one or more privateers. They missed, however, investors and agents such as Henry Didier and John N. D’Arcy, vastly underestimated the involvement of investor Thomas Sheppard, and, as they could not touch merchants living abroad, spent little time pursuing investors and armadores such as Buenos Aires residents David De Forest, William P. Ford, and Juan Pedro Aguirre.

Furthermore, investors and their associates operated discreetly. With jail time and fines potentially awaiting anyone who owned a privateer, investors seldom made public their involvement. But even amongst themselves they could be tight-lipped. For example, David De Forest, an American by birth but long residing in Buenos Aires, openly supported the revolutions and came to the United States in 1817 to lobby the government to recognize the independence of his adopted homeland. Yet he appeared reserved position when writing to his privateering associates. He rarely spoke of owners or investors and seldom employed such phrases as “my” vessel, “your” vessel, or “his” vessel. Rather, De Forest spoke of agents—agents for the owners, agents for the officers and crew, agents for other merchants—thereby separating himself and his correspondents from potential trouble. American neutrality laws dictated punishment for anyone “knowingly concerned” in owning, fitting out, or arming a vessel “with the intent” that it would commit hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States. Thus, if they positioned themselves as agents, doing favors for fellow men of business, it might appear that they did not know what was going on and that they certainly did not intend to violate American neutrality.9

From available sources, it appears that Baltimore investors lived within the mainstream of the city’s merchant community. They worked as respected businessmen and served in positions of trust as directors, presidents, and managers of banks and insurance companies. These pillars of the community held positions of responsibility as leaders of fire companies, charities, and civil defense. David Burke, for example, invested in a privateering venture but also pursued trade as proprietor of the David Burke and Sons merchant house, operated a wharf and warehousing business, and acted as director of the Franklin Bank of Baltimore. Burke oversaw poor relief for his ward, promoted the construction of a poor house, and served as president of the Deptford Fire Company. In the 1820s, Burke turned to his roots and managed the local Hibernian society while serving on the admissions committee of the Hibernian Free School for Children of Irish Immigrants. Similarly, Nicholas Stansbury’s investment in the Irresistible stands as one of many activities. A ship chandler, grocer, merchant, and ship owner, Stansbury also acted as director of the Marine Bank of Baltimore (in which some of the specie the
Irresistible captured was later deposited). He had served in the Maryland militia during the War of 1812, directed the Columbian Fire Company, and stood as a candidate for presidential elector. Running lotteries for charity seems to have been one of his specialties. He managed one lottery to build a new Masonic hall and another through which he raised funds for “a House of Industry for the honest and deserving poor.”

Investors comprised an economically mixed group. Although all possessed greater than average wealth, important gradations existed between them. Great merchants, the true mercantile elite, included Dr. Lyde Goodwin, Dr. William T. Graham, and Thomas Sheppard all of whom operated extensive merchant houses and commanded substantial resources. As a young man, Graham had gone to sea as a ship’s surgeon, and moved up in the world when he married into the elite banking family of Alexander Brown and Sons. A merchant and ship owner on his own account, Graham speculated in government securities and served as president of the Farmers and Merchants Bank and as director of the Universal Insurance Company. Another doctor, Lyde Goodwin, born into the prestigious Ridgely family, served in his youth as a supercargo (cargo manager) on voyages to Calcutta. By the 1810s he owned ships and traded extensively, sometimes on his own and sometimes as a partner of the prosperous Hollins-McBlair merchant house. Thomas Sheppard, flour miller, merchant, and ship owner, also held substantial assets. All three men had made significant investments in privateers during the war with Britain and had come out ahead. Together, Sheppard and Goodwin made a $200,000 profit on their ventures.

One of the most active investors and perhaps the wealthiest of all privateering investors, John Gooding, owned a share of at least three South American armed vessels. During the War of 1812, Gooding had partnered with Thomas Hutchins to invest in eleven privateers, from which they made some $521,000. Combined with proceeds from his Caribbean and South American trade, this success allowed him to maintain a large home in the city, a 300-acre farm in the country, and the Timonium estate, a hotel in the Maryland countryside featuring an ice house, mineral springs, stables, jockey club, and race track.

Men of more modest means worked alongside these wealthy investors. John Craig, John Barron Jr., and John Lowell, for example, each owned part of the Paz (also known as the Patriot). Craig and Barron operated a wharf as partners, and Craig also owned scows, chartered vessels, and sold groceries. Barron sold rope. Each dabbled in trade. Lovell, meanwhile, worked as a biscuit baker. Sea captains, too, became investors. James Barnes, James Chaytor, Obadiah Chase, Clement Cathell, John D. Danels, and Thomas Taylor all owned a piece of the vessels they commanded. Joseph Almeida, moreover, appears to have owned at least a part of two vessels at the same time, the Wilson and the Almeida. Although their contributions helped raise the required capital, these smaller-scale investors remained distinct from their wealthier associates.
The men who invested in the privateer Fourth of July provide a glimpse at who made up a single concern. Joseph Karrick, elected business manager of the group, had built a thriving merchant business with dealings throughout Europe and the Caribbean. He also served as director of the Patapsco Insurance Company and maintained an attractive home as well as a counting house. Joseph Snyder, elected Karrick’s assistant, was a sea captain turned grocer, chandler, and merchant. Originally from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, the thriving port of Baltimore drew him from the Philadelphia countryside. Enough successful voyages had allowed him to prosper and leave the sea. Joseph W. Patterson also bought a share. One of the younger children of wealthy merchant William Patterson, he traded through his father’s elite mercantile house. John Sands, at whose home the group “met regularly
to manage the affairs of the concern” as he later testified, was a merchant-tailor and dry goods seller by profession (though he had recently sold his tailor shop before investing in privateering) and a member of the Ancient and Honorable Mechanical Society, a well-known Baltimore civic improvement society.14

Two public officials joined these merchant investors. Matthew Murray served as sheriff of Baltimore County when he became involved in privateering and little information of his personal life survives. Elected in 1815 he served for at least another year. John S. Skinner, by contrast, became a prominent figure in Baltimore. A member of a wealthy family, Skinner had a legal education but possessed sufficient resources to devote himself to politics, public service, and his passion for agriculture. Skinner traded agricultural intelligence with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, published newspapers such as the American Farmer, the American Turf Register and Sporting Magazine, and The Plough, the Loom and the Anvil, and contributed to such riveting tomes as Every Man His Own Cattle Doctor and Essay on Ass and Mule. As Agent for the Exchange of Prisoners in 1814, Francis Scott Key accompanied him on a mission to the British naval commander to negotiate the release of Dr. William Beanespandersopa. The British detained Skinner and Key who then witnessed the attack on fort McHenry that inspired the “Star-Spangled Banner.” Afterward, Skinner’s relationship with Madison secured him the office of Baltimore postmaster, which he held from 1816 to 1839.15

Sea captain Thomas Taylor also belonged to the group. Originally from Wilmington, Delaware, he had moved to Buenos Aires and become involved in the republic’s navy. He brought the vessel’s commission from South America and planned to be captain. John G. Johnston, another sea captain with previous experience as a South American privateer, joined him as the owner of a full share. Merchant B.K. Harrison also owned a share and James Holmes and James Williams of Annapolis each owned half a share.16

Regardless of their numbers and the amount of their shares, Baltimore-based investors could not have operated a privateering concern without the armadores, agents, and investors living in South America. For Buenos Aires privateers, supporters included foreigners residing in the city, among them Americans David De Forest, William P. Ford, John Higginbotham, and Thomas Taylor, British merchants Adam Guy and George MacFarlane, and the German-born John C. Zimmerman, who had also lived in New York City and Baltimore before coming to Buenos Aires as a supercargo. South Americans such as Patricio Lynch, the son of an Irish family of merchants living in South America, and the Aguirre brothers, Manuel and Juan Pedro, also played an important role. Manuel traveled to the United States as an agent of the Buenos Aires government in 1817 and purchased vessels for the navy while sounding out the U.S. government’s position on recognizing South American independence. Meanwhile, Juan Pedro Aguirre had come to the United States in 1811 to buy arms for the Buenos Aires government and held
several government positions in the 1810s prior to falling out of favor and being exiled in 1820. He returned a year later and eventually became not only the president of the national legislature but also a rancher and, according to one scholar, “the most prominent Buenos Aires banker.” With his connections to the government and ties to merchants, he acted as armadore more frequently than anyone else.\textsuperscript{17}

Oriental Republic privateers also took advantage of political and mercantile connections in Buenos Aires. When its own seaport, Monte Video, fell to the Royalists in January 1817, its armed vessels had no place to go. As a result, privateers either received support clandestinely from agents along the Rio de la Plata or came into Buenos Aires. Thomas Lloyd Halsey, the United States consul to Buenos Aires, controlled the distribution of Oriental commissions. John R. Mifflin, an American merchant in Buenos Aires, assisted him as did Adam Pond, a sea captain and agent. Halsey took a cut of the prize money for providing the service. Neither the Buenos Aires government nor the U.S. government approved, however, and Halsey lost his position.\textsuperscript{18}

Rivalries developed between some South American investors. De Forest and Halsey, for example, had little affection for each other. De Forest coveted Halsey’s position as U.S. consul (a job he had been angling for since at least 1805). Halsey blamed him for poisoning his relationship with the Buenos Aires leadership and getting him in trouble with the State Department at home. De Forest had once invited him to a social function with the promise to “bury our animosities,” but the consul refused. De Forest then called him “a most contemptible coxcomb,” ridiculed his character (“I know you to be a bankrupt as to property and believe you to be nearly so as to reputation”), and heaped abuse on his standing in the community (“Thos. Wilson not only despises but abhors you”).\textsuperscript{19}

More often, though, South American investors formed a close-knit group, at least at the beginning. Those associated with De Forest proved particularly cohesive. Ford, Higginbotham, and Juan Pedro Aguirre all had ongoing business relationships with each other and with De Forest beyond their privateering interests. Moreover, De Forest paid special attention to Patricio Lynch, making him a partner in 1815 and finding employment for his four brothers. Benito, Manuel, and Felix became clerks in their counting house and De Forest helped establish Estanislao as a merchant in Chile. As he prepared to leave Buenos Aires for the United States, De Forest turned his affairs over to Patricio’s new partnership with Zimmerman. He felt warmly towards his young protégés, once writing that he felt bound to them “as a Father is to a child.”\textsuperscript{20}

Getting to Sea

Once organized and financed, the legal threat inherent in exposing the venture’s true purpose complicated the operation. Prosecution awaited anyone owning, equipping, fitting out, or arming a foreign warship or shipping men to serve aboard such a mission. Would-be privateers, then, needed to be careful.
Their chief obstacle was the customs house. All vessels departing for foreign ports needed to file clearance papers attesting to the ship’s owners, master, destination, cargo, size and nationality of crew (the law required two-thirds be American), and any arms they carried. To report to the custom’s officer one morning with a one-hundred-man crew, a dozen cannon glistening in the sun, and the blue and white flag of Buenos Aires flying overhead would arouse suspicion. Thus, privateers usually cleared as American merchantmen bound on a voyage to some Caribbean or European port, manned by a small crew appropriate to such a venture. On at least two occasions, privateers cleared for a sealing voyage to the northwest coast of America, which may have helped explain a larger crew and more provisions than would be needed for a short hop to Cuba. The captain rarely signed the clearance papers himself—typically the first lieutenant would present himself as master and sail the vessel from port, providing one more layer of protection.21

Although privateers left Baltimore with little of the manpower or equipment they would eventually need, it took four days to sail down the bay to the ocean and an abundance of coves, inlets, streams, and rivers provided the cover for captains to bring their ships up to full strength. After clearing Baltimore and dropping below Fort McHenry, privateers stopped at a prearranged spot in the Chesapeake and met pilot boats or small schooners that carried additional men and arms.

To rendezvous with supply boats required planning and execution. Captain William Joseph Stafford’s Patriota, for example, left Baltimore in early 1817 with twenty men and dropped anchor at New Point Comfort, not far from the Chesapeake’s capes. A boat, a sloop, and the schooner Jane all brought more men from Baltimore, and a pilot boat sent to Norfolk returned with an additional twenty-three. These vessels also brought muskets, pistols, sabers, powder, ammunition, shot, and fourteen carronades: six nine-pounders, six eighteen-pounders, and two enormous thirty-two-pounders. Altogether, a vessel that left port on a merchant voyage put to sea with 112 men and fourteen guns.22

The Republicana’s trip down the bay became even more complicated. Led by Obadiah Chase and Robert M. Goodwin, the Republicana left Baltimore in company with the Athenian. As a foreign warship, the Republicana entered Baltimore
to refit, repair, or resupply on the condition that it left with the same complement of men and arms it carried when it arrived. The owners of the Republicana, however, wanted to replace this vessel with the faster-sailing Athenian. The two cleared port separately, the Republicana as a privateer under Chase and the Athenian as a merchant vessel bound for St. Bart’s with Goodwin as passenger, John Smith as master, and thirteen men as her crew (a crew extraordinarily well-supplied with food and water, one sailor observed). Next, the Athenian headed for New Point Comfort while the Republicana stopped at Annapolis to meet James Hooper’s schooner. Hooper, a Baltimore innkeeper and shipping agent, had signed up the privateer’s crew. This vessel brought a shipment of powder, ball, ammunition, grape shot, rammers, sponges, worms, ladles, and stinkpots. The Republicana then met the Athenian, transferred the men and arms, and the two vessels sailed in company for St. Bart’s.\textsuperscript{23}

Other vessels attempted to finesse the neutrality laws by clearing Baltimore for a voyage to a foreign port and actually going there before discharging the crew, dismantling the ship, and selling it to a foreign owner. David De Forest claimed that the schooner Swift left Baltimore and completed a voyage to Port au Prince, at which point its master, James Barnes, purchased the vessel for him. As a naturalized citizen of Buenos Aires, De Forest claimed that he had the right to fit out privateers for his nation. Captain John Danels combined approaches. His first lieutenant, James Cox, cleared his vessel, the Irresistable, for Tenerife, took on men and arms heading out of the Chesapeake, and sailed directly to the Rio de la Plata, where he discharged the crew, laid up the vessel sold it to the government of the Oriental Republic at a nominal cost. Danels then rearmed, resupplied, and reshipped his men for their cruise. He later claimed that as he did not actually attack any vessels before receiving his commission he had stayed within the law.\textsuperscript{24}

Motives

A complicated, expensive, and dangerous venture, those who engaged in South American privateering knew they could easily find themselves in jail. Why, then, did they do it? For common sailors the lure of prize money and adventure, the call to serve the cause of independence, the burden of debt, and the stupor of drunkenness all led to signing aboard. Independence, both personal and political, moved some men to sign up for a cruise. As one young man wrote to his brother before departing on the privateer Buenos Ayres, “I have made up my mind as to my future Life, the first step into which is to leave this place. This would have been my aim long since had not poverty prevented me.” Another impetuous youth, Stephen Lusk, sailed aboard the privateer Republicana in search, he said, of a “South American adventure.” At first, he planned to enter the Buenos Aires army to fight alongside General San Martin but then decided the sea suited him better.\textsuperscript{25}

Other common sailors aboard South American privateers did not join willingly.
Running up debt to a sailor-town innkeeper ranked often forced men to sea. For example, of the fourteen men deposed in the prosecution of innkeeper William Bush, six carried debt at the time they signed the shipping articles. Sailor Edward Foley, debt free in January 1820, learned from his innkeeper that the last of the winter merchant vessels had already sailed. Foley later stated that he did not want to be a privateer, but signing on would keep him from running up debt. Rather than spend months in port running up debt, he “got drunk and did ship on board the armed brig.”

The source of contention behind mutinies and other disturbances aboard ship help illustrate the crews’ mixed motives. Some men plainly did not want to be at sea in search of Spanish prizes. The crew of the *Patriota* grew angry when they learned that Captain Stafford planned a privateering cruise rather than the merchant voyage for which they had signed up. Robert Richards felt “betrayed,” as he later said, and estimated that at least two-thirds of the crew felt likewise. Matthew Page Godfrey later complained of being entrapped. As a result, he said, “much commotion was produced on board.” After forty days at sea, that commotion erupted into full-scale mutiny. A standoff followed in which the captain alternated between threatening to blow up the ship himself and promising his men that he would still “make all their fortunes,” as he had said. After eighteen hours, Stafford had won over enough men to force the others into submission.

Captain John Chase angered his men when he switched the republic they represented. The crew had signed on as shipping men for a Buenos Aires privateer, but once at sea Chase announced he had a commission from Jose Artigas, leader of the Oriental Republic. The change upset some of the men, who “declared that they were for the Liberty & Independence of Buenos Ayres,” and “being shipped for Buenos Ayres they would not declare for Artigas.” Other crews found fault with a commander who did not make their fortunes fast enough. The men of the *Caroné*, frustrated by a lack of prizes, turned on their captain, William Saunders, declaring him “no Privateersman,” a leader who was, they said, “too mild and honest.” The crew elected David Ewing captain and deposited Saunders on a passing merchant vessel. They began taking prizes within a few days.

Captains provide strong evidence of an ideological motivation. Captain Thomas Taylor, for example, wore a uniform, and, according to one sailor, had his crew take “the oath for the Independence of South America” before setting sail. Captain John Danels named one of his sons Bolivar and later served in the Colombian Navy. In 1822 he sat for a portrait in full Colombian Naval regalia. Meanwhile, John Chase, when his days sailing for South America had ended, reflected warmly on the experience. “I shall ever rank among the proudest reminiscences of my life,” he wrote, “that I have been able to do the state of Buenos Ayres some service.”

For some, plain old plunder was good enough, and even sympathy for South American independence came with a need to attend to their own finances. Still, ideology mattered. James Chaytor, for example, commanded the privateer
Independencia del Sud (the “Independence of the South”) and he did take the independence of the south seriously. He faithfully served Buenos Aires by capturing Spanish vessels and turning them over to the government, by following the rules of warfare closely enough to avoid indictment for piracy or neutrality violations, and by volunteering to clean up the shadier side of privateering by suppressing illegal commissions. Chaytor also came to sign himself by the Spanish version of his name, “Diego Chaytor” or simply “DC.” In fact, he went back and forth in his correspondence, using James or JC on some occasions and Diego or DC on others. He did so when writing to government officials and business associates and even when writing to his wife. Chaytor once wrote, “My whole soul is devoted to the cause, and every honorable means must be used for its success.” The fact that he unconsciously slipped into calling himself Diego is significant.

Devotion to the mission, however, did not stop Chaytor from complaining about his financial setbacks. “My ambition to promote the cause of La Plata has completely ruined me,” he wrote to an associate in 1819. “I have, since I joined the glorious cause of South America, armed four vessels in its defence[,] I have sacrificed my fortune to its greatness—had I millions it should be employed in its cause.” But Chaytor did not have millions, and the cash-strapped government of Buenos Aires delayed paying him. Plagued by debt, Chaytor left Buenos Aires and lent his services to Colombia where he eventually received an appointment as the head of the nation’s Marine Department—just in time for Simón Bolívar (whom Chaytor admired) to cut back the navy’s funding. He thought about pursuing employment in the Mexican navy, but decided to return to Baltimore instead. In 1827, Chaytor wrote a letter to his son-in-law, W.G.D. Worthington, another promoter of South American independence, in which he revealed a bit of ambivalence when he recalled his “years of service toil in the noble cause of South American emancipation.” He wrote “service” but went back and changed it to “toil.”

Opposition

Foreign privateering may have been illegal but American authorities had little success stopping the activity. Still, privateers hardly operated unopposed. New laws, more aggressive enforcement, criminal indictments, and civil law suits all took their toll, and by 1820, South American privateering declined and officials nearly forced the practice out of Baltimore.

When South American privateers began operating from the city in 1816, existing neutrality legislation gave authorities little power to stop them. Small naval vessels occasionally patrolled the Chesapeake, and customs collectors who received word that privateers were smuggling prize goods ashore sent the revenue cutter to stop them. Control of the problem, however, had to begin with the authority to stop privateers as they outfitted their vessels, a strategy far simpler on paper than in practice. Privateers cleared customs as merchants, increased supplies further down the
bay, and changed their purpose at sea, following the letter of the law closely enough to prevent interference from authorities. Local authorities certainly suspected this activity, but under the 1794 and 1797 laws, suspicions alone did not carry the legal weight to act. As Secretary of State James Monroe complained, the law worked after the fact “upon the general footing of punishing the offence merely where, if there be full evidence of the actual perpetration of the crime, the party is handed over, after trial, to the penalty denounced.” As a result, Monroe found it “extremely difficult, under existing circumstances, to prevent or punish this infraction of the law.”

In 1817, Congress enacted preemptive neutrality legislation that directed customs officials to collect a bond from any armed vessel owned in whole or in part by Americans before it cleared port. Likewise, any vessel arriving in port that appeared “manifestly built for warlike purposes”—that is, if its cargo were principally arms, if it carried a suspicious number of men, or if any other circumstances indicated “probable” hostile activity, customs officers had the authority to detain the vessel until its owner gave bond to ensure good conduct. In either situation the bond required amounted to double the value of the vessel, cargo, and arms—a hefty sum for a $35,000 privateer.

Congress revisited the legislation the following year after discovering imprecision in the law’s language and hearing complaints from those who considered the punishment too harsh. Additionally, three separate neutrality laws proved unwieldy. The 1818 Neutrality Act thus repealed and replaced all previous neutrality legislation, articulated its provisions more clearly, and reduced punishments for all offenses. For example, owning an illegal privateer now carried a $10,000 fine and three years in jail rather than a $10,000 fine and ten years behind bars. Yet the requirement that all foreign armed vessels post bond remained in force.

In 1820, Congress acted once more to curtail South American privateering and passed a law that allowed foreign warships to enter only a select list of U.S. ports. Baltimore did not appear on the list. John Quincy Adams explained that the law passed with one intent, “to suppress the Baltimore pirates.” Customs agents had the power to pursue privateering more aggressively, to raise the cost of “making fit” in the U.S. more expensive, and to remove any legitimate reason for their vessels to be anywhere near the port city on the Patapsco River—Congress had created the legal powers necessary to combat South American privateering.

The stricter laws went quickly into effect. Baltimore customs collector James McCulloh instructed his officers to “examine, visit, and report to this office all and every privateer or ship of war under foreign colors.” Officers thus went into the bay in search of vessels to inspect and seize rather than waiting for them at the docks. McCulloh told privateers to quit hovering in the Chesapeake and informed them that they either had to come into port and post bond or leave U.S. waters. McCulloh apparently enjoyed his new power. The Spanish consul had frequently abused him, and John Quincy Adams had written condescendingly, he “is a very
honest man . . . [but also] an enthusiast for the South Americans, and easily duped by knaves, because he thinks all other men as honest as himself.” The newly prestigious position allowed him to answer his critics and their “occasional ravings on the subject of South American cruisers.”

The wider reach of McCulloh’s power did not secure higher conviction rates for Federal District Attorney Elias Glenn. Between 1817 and 1820, Glenn prosecuted just fourteen owners, twelve captains and officers, and four shipping agents for their role in illegal privateering—a dismal record. Charges included neutrality violations, piracy, and on two occasions, slave smuggling. Ordinarily, Glenn did not pursue common sailors. Rather, he left them alone in exchange for testimony against their leaders. Common sailors only stood trial when they had turned on their officers (and sometimes killed them) before running away with the ship and cruising against neutral vessels, including those belonging to Americans.

Although the record is incomplete, remaining documents suggest that no owner, captain, officer, or shipping agent ever spent a single night in jail or lost a penny in fines. The circuit court’s minute book does not record a verdict for each man, nor is notice of their conviction found in the newspapers. Given the notoriety of the charges and the high profile of some defendants, a guilty verdict would have been newsworthy.

Common sailors did not fare as well. Between 1816 and 1820, government agents in Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia arrested at least 129 men on charges of piracy for commandeering vessels and attacking neutrals. Records of verdicts in these cases are also incomplete, but it appears that the court found thirty-one guilty of piracy. From April to June 1820 seven of them were executed, in Boston, Baltimore, Charleston, and Savannah. Eventually, the rest gained respite or pardon with their sentences commuted to time served. These seven men are the only Baltimore affiliated South American privateers known to suffer real criminal penalties.

Prosecutions, then, hardly discouraged illegal activity. In fact, arresting wayward sailors actually pleased some privateer captains and investors. “It will afford the govt. of South America much satisfaction,” David De Forest informed Secretary of State Adams, “to learn that the U.S. will prosecute those mutineers; and punish such as are found guilty of crime, according to the law.” De Forest wanted sailors who stole his prizes brought to justice.

The civil court cases produced different results. Any joy privateers may have felt about staying out of prison must have been short-lived as the courts ordered their prizes restored to the original Spanish or Portuguese owners and ordered them to forfeit their vessels to the U.S. government. Of the thirty-three Maryland civil cases for which a decision can be found, the district court ordered a vessel or cargo restored to its former owner eighteen times and ordered privateering vessels forfeited to the United States three times. Privateers won twelve cases but
appealed fifteen to the Maryland Circuit Court or all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. Outcomes at the circuit court level can only be found for eight cases and privateers paid a steep price for their crimes. The court affirmed two victories but reversed another and affirmed an order of restoration in five other cases. Of the seven cases that went before the Supreme Court, and for which a decision can be found, the court ordered property restored to its former owners each time and in one case overturned an earlier victory in a lower court. Thus, of those twelve Maryland District Court victories for privateers only eight remained intact.42

The numbers in other jurisdictions tell a similar story. Privateers fared better in the New York District Court where four of the five cases for which a decision can be found were decided in their favor (and, apparently, none was appealed). In Virginia, however, privateers lost six out of seven cases and two appeals, one of which ended with a restoration affirmed and one resulting in a condemnation reversed (bringing the record to two wins and five losses). The strictest court sat in Massachusetts where privateers lost all six of their cases and the one appeal resulted in an affirmation of the lower court’s ruling. In the final accounting, privateers lost property more often than they gained.43

As a result, civil suits did more to disrupt privateering than filing criminal charges. Giving back their captured goods and losing their (very expensive) vessels made the venture much too costly to sustain and the power of the civil courts made sailing for the independence of South America a bad investment. Even De Forest, who was as committed to the revolution as anyone, began feeling financial pressures. “You do not appear to know,” he wrote to Lynch and
Zimmerman, “how much anxiety I have had on acct. of my fears of suits brought by Spanish claimants, although I have openly pretended to the contrary.” To get by, De Forest turned to “the needful economy.”

Mounting losses could not have come at a worse time for Baltimore investors. The Panic of 1819, with roots in the scandal at the Maryland branch of the Second Bank of the United States, devastated the city’s merchant community. During one week in May two of the largest firms, Smith and Buchannan and Hollins and McBlair, both stopped payment on their accounts, and by July over one hundred merchants had failed, including privateer investors and agents John D’Arcy, Henry Didier, John Gooding, Lyde Goodwin, Joseph Karrick, Thomas Sheppard, and Nicholas Stansbury. To cope, Gooding eventually resorted to renting out his home in town (a “large three story Dwelling House” with stables) and at length the chancery court ordered his country house and farmland sold to satisfy creditors. Meanwhile, Karrick put his house on the market. His advertisement promised it contained “every comfort and convenience that a family could desire.” He meant, of course, every comfort and convenience his family could desire, before he lost his money.

Baltimore’s investors shared many financial interests, and the losses they suffered during the panic rippled through the network of South American merchants who supported privateering. D’Arcy and Didier argued with Juan Pedro Aguirre, John Higginbotham, and William P. Ford, whom they not only called a scoundrel, but “as great a scoundrel as Higginbotham.” Gooding pestered De Forest for payments from the capture of the Spanish brig Sereno, even though they had already settled their privateer accounts. “He calls all [his] unsettled & troublesome business, my business; and he has written me several insolent letters,” De Forest complained as he grew afraid of Gooding’s influence. “Gooding & co. are all bankrupts and he shows a strong disposition to involve me in the same ruin,” he later wrote.

Normally, De Forest could have sued Gooding and allowed the courts to sort out who owed what to whom—but not in matters of illegal business. Gooding could only write insolent letters while De Forest gossiped about him to other merchants, an inadequate solution. Ultimately, he owed the Sereno’s Spanish owners $54,000, most of which, he said, was Gooding’s debt. Privateering investors had no legal recourse through which to resolve conflicts.

Conclusion
South American privateering from Baltimore grew into a highly-organized business that attracted members of the mainstream merchant community. Although privateers certainly wanted to come home with a profit, the ideology of revolution also played an important role in their decision to invest. Stopping South American privateers proved equally complicated. Arrests and trials made no great
impact on the practice, but attacking the underlying organization with measures that led to higher financial costs did have an effect. In addition, authorities benefitted when the Panic of 1819 devastated the Baltimore merchants who supported the illegal enterprise. South American privateers, many with complex business and financial backgrounds, defy the simple label of “patriot.” Nevertheless, for many, privateering stood as the most important work of a lifetime spent at sea.
## Appendix A

### Investors, Armadores, and Agents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Select Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.P. Aguirre</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>Investor, Merchant; De Forest associate; Arms Agent in the U.S. (1811)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Almeida</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Investor, Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Barnes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Investor, Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Barron, Jr.</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Wharfinger, Merchant, Rope Seller; Partner of John Craig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Brown</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Burke</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant, David Burke and Sons; director Franklin Bank of Baltimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Castello</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement Cathell</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Investor, Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obadiah Chase</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Investor, Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Chaytor</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Investor, Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Craig</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Grocer; Scow Owner; Charters Vessels; Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John D. Danels</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John N. D’Arcy</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Investor; Merchant, D’Arcy &amp; Didier; D’Arcy, Dodge, &amp; Co. (Haiti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David De Forest</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>Investor, Am. Merchant, Buenos Aires Consul to the U.S. (unrecognized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Didier</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Merchant, partner D’Arcy and Didier and D’Arcy, Dodge, and Co. in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dorsey</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William P. Ford</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>Investor, American Merchant at Buenos Ayres (from Philadelphia, Pa.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gooding</td>
<td>Investor, agent</td>
<td>Merchant and Ship Owner, John Gooding and Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyde Goodwin</td>
<td>Investor, agent</td>
<td>Doctor, Merchant, Ship Owner; Partner of Hollins and McBlair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. M. Goodwin</td>
<td>Marine, agent</td>
<td>Investor; Merchant, relative of Ridgely Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wm. T. Graham</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant, Ship Owner; Farmers and Merchants Bank; Universal Ins. Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Guy</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>Agent: British Merchant at Buenos Ayres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. L. Halsey</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>U.S. Consul at Buenos Ayres, 1812–1819; born Providence, R.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.K. Harrison</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant; partner Harrison and Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Background Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Higginbotham</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>American Merchant at Buenos Ayres; Possible Investor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Holmes</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. G. Johnston</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Investor; Captain and Merchant in Haitian Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Karrick</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant; director Patapsco Ins. Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John La Borde</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Levy</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Possible Investor; U.S. Consul at St. Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lowell</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Biscuit Baker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricio Lynch</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>Investor; Agent; Merchant; De Forest assoc. Lynch, Zimmerman and Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John R. Mifflin</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>American Merchant at Buenos Ayres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jero Miner</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant at Savannah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Morgan</td>
<td>Investor, agent</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat. Murray</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Sheriff of Baltimore Co. (1815–1816)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Oliver</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Merchant and Ship Owner; Millionaire, winding down trade by 1810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. W. Patterson</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant, William Patterson and Sons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Pond</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Agent; Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Sands</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Merchant Tailor; Dry Goods Seller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thos. Sheppard</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Investor, Agent; Flour Miller, Merchant, Ship Owner; Mechanic’s Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John S. Skinner</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Lawyer, backed Carrera and McGregor Expeditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Snyder</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Former Sea Captain; Ship Chandler; Grocer; Merchant; Ship Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Stansbury</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Ship Chandler and Grocer; Merchant and Ship Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Taylor</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>Sea Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Tenant</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Merchant and Ship Owner; Wharf and Ropewalk Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Williams</td>
<td>Investor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Zimmerman</td>
<td>Armadore</td>
<td>Investor; Merchant at Buenos Ayres; De Forest associate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Jerome Garitee, *Republic’s Private Navy*; Harold A. Bierck, Jr., “Spoils, Soils, and Skinner”; Carranza, *Campañas Navales*, vol 2; McCreary, *Ancient and Honorable*; Keen, *David Curtis De Forest*; Bemis, *Early Diplomatic Missions*; De Forest Papers; numerous case files, MDDC, Adm. and NYDC, Adm.; many newspapers, especially the *Baltimore Price Current* and the *Baltimore Patriot*. All individuals are from Baltimore unless otherwise noted.
Notes

1. News of George Washington’s birthday party can be found in The American Beacon (Norfolk, Va.), October 5, 1818.


3. In the period under discussion, Uruguay was located across the Rio de la Plata from Buenos Aires, ruled by the gaucho Jose Artigas, and at war with both Spain and Portuguese Brazil, its neighbor to the north. For the appeal of South American independence in Baltimore, see Laura Bornholdt, Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism: A Study in the Background of the Monroe Doctrine (Northampton, Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, 1949). For the popularity of privateering in other sea ports, see A. Curtis Wilgus, “Some Notes on Spanish American Patriot Activity along the Atlantic Seaboard, 1816–1822,” The North Carolina Historical Review, 4 (1927), 172–81. The scale of South American privateering from Baltimore has been gleaned from many sources, for example, Notes of the Grand Jury, Nov. 1818, Depositions Regarding Baltimore Privateers in South American Waters, 1818–1819, Records on Privateers and Pirates, 1813–1835, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, Md. (hereinafter College Park Depositions); Thomas Lloyd Halsey Letters in the Jonathan D. Meredith Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); National Standard (Middlebury, Vt.), October 21, 1818; American Beacon (Norfolk, Va.), July 20, 1819; Lewis Winkler Bealer, “The Privateers of Buenos Aires, 1815–1821: Their Activities in the Hispanic American Wars of Independence” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1935); Benjamin Keen, David Curtis De Forest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1947); Agustín Beraza, Los Cosarios de Artigas (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1949), appendix; Anjel Justiniano Carranza, Campañas Navales de la República Argentina (1915–1916; 2nd ed. 1962, 4 vols., Buenos Aires: Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales), 2: 180–229. According to Jerome Garitee, Baltimore launched 112 private-armed vessels during the War of 1812. There were two kinds of commissioned vessels, the private men-of-war most often thought of as privateers and the merchantmen licensed to make captures if the opportunity arose known as letters-of-marque. Forty-seven vessels operated as private men-of-war, suggesting that Baltimore’s participation in South American privateering, which included only private men-of-war, was comparable to Baltimore’s role in War of 1812 privateering. See Jerome Garitee, The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812 (Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1977), 197.


5. For Baltimore’s post-war economy, see Gary Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789–1861.


Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 66.

8. Robert Oliver provided insurance for James Chaytor’s Independencia del Sud. Given the illegality of this type of venture, insurers would have been dubious about writing policies on privateers. Oliver, Journal, Dec. 1816, Robert Oliver Record Books, 1759–1823, MS 662.1, box 20, Maryland Historical Society; Armadore (literally: “shipbuilder”) is the Spanish name for the person who played the role of agent and go-between with the government issuing a commission, similar to the ship’s husband in U.S. privateering or the armateur in British and French practice. See Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 103; David J. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1990), 67; and Patrick Crowhurst, The French War on Trade: Privateering 1793–1815 (Aldershot, UK: Scolar Press, 1989), 84.

9. See, for example, David De Forest to Thomas Tenant, January 7, 1819, to Jesse Putnam, September 5, 1818, to John Gooding, March 25, 1819, and to John D’Arcy and Henry Didier, July 28, 1819, De Forest Family Papers (Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, Ct.). All four neutrality laws (1794, 1797, 1817, and 1818) employed the same language.

10. Burke, Baltimore Price Current, July 19, 1817; Baltimore Patriot, April 17, 1816, April 24, 1818, November 4, 1818, February 10, 1819, April 20, 1819, October 26, 1819, May 1, 1820, March 21, 1822, April 1, 1824; Stansbury, Baltimore Patriot, February 25, 1817; Washington Gazette, January 28, 1819; Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 268.


12. Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 263, 266; Baltimore Price Current, May 25, 1816, August 15, 1818; Baltimore Patriot, October 12, 1816, November 25, 1816, March 29, 1821, September 16, 1823, January 9, 1834; Franklin Gazette (Phila.) March 10, 1818; Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 263, 266.


14. John Sands revealed the details of the group’s organization in his State Department deposition, January 8, 1819, College Park Depositions and a newspaper article defending his involvement, New York Daily Advertiser, August 27, 1819. Karrick, Baltimore Patriot, December 16, 1813, September 2, 1814, September 16, 1815, February 26, 1816, November 18, 1816; Baltimore Price Current, March 28, 1812, April 18, 1812, April 25, 1812, August 11, 1812, November 7, 1812, August 26, 1816, September 2, 1815, May 4, 1816. Snyder, Baltimore Price Current, July 21, 1810; Baltimore Patriot, June 16, 1816, October 1, 1817, June 29, 1818, February 10, 1819, July 5, 1819, February 14, 1823, June 30, 1823; Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 33–35; Patterson in Dielman–Hayward File, MdHS; Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 200, 262. Sands, Federal Republican and Commercial Gazette (Baltimore), February 10, 1810; Baltimore Patriot, March 16, 1813, November 30, 1813;
For examples, see libel of Joaquim Jose Vasques, February 20, 1814; George W. McCreary, The Ancient and Honorable Mechanical Company of Baltimore (Baltimore: Kohn and Pollock, 1901), 157.


16. Affidavit of Taylor, September 3, 1818, Thomas Stoughton on behalf of Juan Juando and Others v. Thomas Taylor, NYDC, Adm.; The American Watchman (Wilmington, Del.), September 26, 1818. Johnston: Baltimore Price Current, September 2, 1815; U.S. v. Perthshire alias Arismendi alias Snap Dragon alias Mendoza, transcript of proceedings in the District Court, Appellate Case Files, United States Circuit Court for Maryland (Baltimore), Records of Circuit Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, National Archives and Records Administration—Mid-Atlantic Region (Philadelphia) (hereafter MDCC, Appel). The District Court case file for this suit no longer exists, leaving the transcript copied and sent up to the Circuit Court on appeal as the only record. B.K. Harrison, deposition of Matthew Murray, October 21, 1818, Joaquim Jose Vasques v. Sundry Bales of Cotton, a Quantity of Sugar, Hides, and Sides of Leather, NYDC, Adm. This Murray was an inn keeper, not the sheriff and fellow investor.


18. For the secret river meetings, see deposition of Charles Staples and Joseph Atkinson, September 15, 1818, College Park Depositions. For Halsey’s efforts securing commissions see his letters to William H. Winder, September 30, 1821, to Henry Didier, September 30, 1821, and to John Guyer, October 1, 1821 in the Halsey Letters, Jonathan Meredith Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) as well as U.S. v. Bass (1819) 24 F. Cas. 1028. For Halsey’s dismissal, see Keen, David Curtis De Forest, 124 and Joseph Byrne Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings (New York: MacMillan, 1920), 180. Halsey got into more trouble by promising the government of Buenos Aires a $2 million loan from Americans to be backed by the U.S. government, without its approval. See Bemis, Early Diplomatic Missions, 43n.


20. De Forest to William P. Ford, May 15, 1819, De Forest Papers; Keen, David Curtis De Forest, 98. De Forest carried on a regular correspondence with these men, which can be found in his papers. Also, Estanislao’s partner, Henry Hill, regularly wrote the same group, making clear the interlocking relationship between them. See Hill to De Forest, September 18, 1817, and October 11, 1817; to Lynch, Zimmerman, and Co. October 11, 1817 and October 18, 1817; and to Ford, August 5, 1817, Henry Hill Papers (Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, Ct.).

21. Fitting out, arming, clearing a vessel, and shipping a crew were key issues in many cases. For examples, see libel of Joaquim Jose Vasques, February 5, 1819, Vasques v. Sociedad Feliz; depositions of Robert W. Richards, June 15, 1817, and Matthew Page Godfrey, September 5,
1817, Joaquim Jose. Zamorano v. Sundry Goods, Wares, and Merchandise, libel of Joao Jose and Manuel Laurence, May 15, 1819, Joao Jose, Manuel Laurence and Others v. Clement Cathell, Robert M. Goodwin, and Others for the Illegal Taking of the Portuguese Ship Don Pedro Alcantara and her Cargo; deposition of Joseph Smith, n.d., Joaquim Jose Vasques v. The Cargo of the Brig Fanny, Clement Cathell and Nathaniel Babson; all from Admiralty Case Files, United States District Court for Maryland (Baltimore), Records of District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, National Archives and Records Administration—Mid-Atlantic Region (Philadelphia), (hereafter MDDC, Adm.).

22. Oftentimes sailors were recruited in Baltimore before the vessel cleared. Depositions of Richards and Godfrey, Zamorano v. Sundry Goods, MDDC, Adm.


25. Jonathan H. Falconar to Abraham H. Falconar, September 27, 1816 and March 23, 1819, Abraham H. Falconar Papers, 1815–1852, MS 345.1, box 1, MdBHS; Stephen Lusk to Nicholas Ridgely, June 24, 1818, Ridgely Family Papers, 1664–1882, MS 692, Nicholas Ridgely Correspondence, box 7, MdBHS.


29. Deposition of Francis Navarre, February 24, 1819, U.S. v. Eight Cases of Dry Goods, Four Pieces of Cloth, Four Pieces of Silk, and Four Papers of Silk Handkerchiefs, MDDC, Adm. Common sailors’ understanding of liberty has been the subject of debate recently with Paul Gilje arguing that although sailors could act ideologically, they more often associated freedom with drinking, spending freely, and carousing. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, by contrast, have argued that sailors constituted an ideologically driven underclass committed to opposing capitalism. My research suggests that South American privateers were closer to the former than the latter. See Paul Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).

30. William Thornton, January 5, 1817, Thomas Stoughton on behalf of Juan Juando and Others v. Thomas Taylor, NYDC, Adm.; Dielman-Hayward File, MdBHS; [John Chase], To the Public (Baltimore, 1832), 18. Matthew Brown has come to a similar conclusion about the mixed motives of British citizens who joined the South American revolutions. See Adventuring Through

31. For examples of Chaytor alternating between JC and DC to the same correspondent, see his letters to Robert K. Lowry and John Myers, October 10, November 10, December 10, and December 20, 1825, and March 1, 1826, James Chaytor Papers (Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.). See also Chaytor to Madam James [Sarah] Chaytor, June 10, 1818, and to Adam Guy, November 30, 1819, James Chaytor Papers, MS 230, MdHS. Chaytor’s papers can be found in two collections, one box at MdHS and two boxes at Princeton.

32. Chaytor to Guy, November 30, 1819, and to [W.G.D. Worthington], December 14, 1826, Chaytor Papers, MdHS.


34. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 58, 3 United States Statutes at Large, 370–71.


37. James McCulloch to William Lowry, November 15, 1819; Alexander Beard, October 29, 1818, and June 27, 1819; Lt. Marshall, March 26, 1819, and April 22, 1819; John Webster, December 3, 1819; William Jackson, December 3, 1819; and William Crawford, May 14, 1819, FRUS, 498, 485, 473, 491–92, 499–500, 499, 495; John Quincy Adams, March 29, 1819, Memoirs, IV, 318.

38. Privateering indictments dominated the Maryland Circuit Court’s docket from May 1817 through November 1820; sometimes the court dealt with nothing else. See case files for these years in MDCC, Crim. Glenn prosecuted two more men (Joseph Woodward and Joseph Zane) whose roles cannot be determined.

39. Minute Book of the Maryland Circuit Court, Minutes of the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, 1790–1911, National Archives Microfilm Publication M931, reel 1. Karrick’s conviction, though later set aside, was noticed in the papers. See Alexandria (Va.) Gazette and Daily Advertiser, December 18, 1818 and Easton (Md.) Gazette and Eastern Shore Intelligencer, December 21, 1818.

40. In addition to the Circuit Court Criminal case files and the Minute Book of the Circuit Court cited above, these figures have been compiled from numerous sources, including reports from federal law reporters such as U.S. v. Hutchings 26 F.Cas. 440; U.S. v. Brush, the General Rondeau 24 F.Case 1281; U.S. v. Chapels 25 F.Cas. 399; U.S. v. Palmer 16 U.S. 610; U.S. v. Furlong, alias Hobson 18 U.S. 184 (also known as U.S. v. Pirates); pamphlets such as The Trial of William Holmes, Thomas Warrington, and Edward Rosewain, on an Indictment for Murder on the High Seas before the Circuit Court of the United States (Boston: Joseph Spear, 1820); Particulars of the Piracies: Committed by the Commanders and Crew of the Buenos Ayrean ship Louisa and those of the sloops Mary, of Mobile and Lawrence, of Charleston: wherein is accurately described the murder of Capt. Sunley, and four of the crew of the British brig Ann, collated from the
statements given by the Bucaniers (Charleston, S.C.: A.E. Miller, 1820); Extracts from the Life of Captain John F. Ferguson, who was Executed in the City of Baltimore, on the Thirteenth Day of April, 1820 (Baltimore: Schaeffer & Maund, 1820); and newspapers including New York Columbian, August 4, 1819; City Gazette (Charleston, S.C.), March 30, 1820; Independent Chronicle (Boston), April 19, 1820; New York Daily Advertiser, June 5, 1820; Alexandria (Va.) Gazette, June 6, 1820; Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, June 23, 1820; Boston Intelligencer and Evening Gazette, June 24, 1820.

41. David De Forest to John Quincy Adams, January 8, 1819, De Forest Papers.

42. Thirty-eight suits were initiated in the Maryland District Court against privateers. I have counted as one suit instances in which the court joined the libels of multiple parties contesting the same property early on in the proceedings and which produced one case file that can now be found at the National Archives (see The Sereno and The Perthshire alias Arismendi alias Snap Dragon alias Mendoza). On the other hand, I have counted separately those libels which initially produced separate case files but were joined later on (for example, Joaquim Zamorano v. Sundry Goods, Wares, and Merchandise, Joaquim Zamorano v. 117 Boxes of Sugar, and Joaquim Zamorano v. John LaBorde and 500 Boxes of Sugar all involved cargo from the Santa Maria and were bundled together as the cases were appealed). This method reflects how cases actually happened without changing the overall results. In four instances, no outcome could be found. In two cases, proceedings were discontinued, once because the Maryland court ceded jurisdiction to the federal court in Savannah, Georgia, and once because the libel was defective. I have counted this instance as a victory for the privateers because it left the contested vessel in their hands. Finally, I have not included the case of U.S. v. Eight Cases of Dry Goods, Four Pieces of Cloth, Four Pieces of Silk, Four Pieces of Silk Handkerchiefs in the sample since it was a libel for a customs violation in which the French consul appeared as claimant; thus, no privateers were contesting the property. Maryland outcomes determined from the Minute Book of the U.S. District Court for Maryland, 1813–1820 and 1820–1823 and the Docket Book of the Maryland Federal District Court, Admiralty Division, 1814–1822, MDDC, Adm. For appeals, see The Gran Para 20 U.S. 471; The Santa Maria 20 U.S. 490; The Arrogante Barcelones 20 U.S. 496; La Nereyda 21 U.S. 108; The Monte Allegre 22 U.S. 616; and The Fanny 22 U.S. 658.

43. In New York, eight libels were filed against Baltimore privateers, but in three instances no outcome can be found. As before, I have counted as a victory for privateers one case that was discontinued since they held onto the disputed property. Outcomes determined from the Minute Book of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, National Archives Microfilm Publication M886, Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1789–1841, roll 5. For Virginia, see the Minute Book of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 1811–1819 and 1819–1850, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1300, Admiralty Case Files of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 1801–1861, roll 1. Appeals can be found in The Wilson v. The United States 30 F. Cas. 239 and The Santissima Trinidad 20 U.S. 23. For Massachusetts, decrees are included in the case files, while the Divina Pastora case was appealed to the Supreme Court: 17 U.S. 52.

44. De Forest to Lynch, Zimmerman and Co. July 2, 1820, and November 9, 1820, and to William Crawford, August 1, 1820, De Forest Papers; Keen, David Curtis De Forest, 126–28, 158.

45. Baltimore Patriot, June 18, 1819, March 29, 1821, and September 16, 1823. For the impact of the Panic on Baltimore, see Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 70–82 and Garitee, Republic’s Private Navy, 33–57.

46. De Forest to D’Arcy and Didier, August 7, 1820, to John Higginbotham, October 17, 1819, and to Lynch, Zimmerman and Co., May 11, 1821. See also De Forest to John Gooding, April 5 and April 11, 1819, De Forest Papers.

47. De Forest to William H. Winder, December 23, 1823, De Forest Papers.
The title of this book is misleading—only two of its thirteen chapters are directly concerned with John Smith’s Chesapeake exploration, and even then they focus on his two trips around the bay during the summer of 1608. Rather, this volume delivers much more than it promises, as complete a reconstruction of the environment and cultures of the Chesapeake Bay region circa 1600–1610 as can be imagined, given the scant nature of the remaining evidence. The product of a joint effort by the Chesapeake Bay Gateways Network, the National Park Service, the Virginia Department of Historic Resources, the Maryland Historical Trust (in commemoration of the 400th anniversary of John Smith’s voyages) and the collaboration of three lead authors and eight contributing authors, *John Smith’s Chesapeake Voyages* is an impressive accomplishment indeed.

The chapters can be divided into three groups, each of which will be of more or less interest to various readers. The first group consists of chapters one through three, which provide general overviews of the early seventeenth-century Chesapeake environment, its various Algonquian-speaking cultures, and the earliest English attempts at settlement, respectively. The second group includes only chapters four and five, which showcase almost day-by-day reconstructions of Smith’s two exploratory voyages around the bay in 1608. Chapters six through thirteen comprise the third group. These chapters continue where the chapters of the first group left off, with more detailed examinations of the environment and cultures of sub-regions with the Chesapeake area, including the James, York, and Rappahannock river drainages and the Lower Eastern Shore in Virginia, and the Middle Eastern Shore, the head of the bay, and the Patuxent and Potomac river basins in Maryland. The book concludes with an epilogue by Robert Carter in which he examines the impact of four hundred years of Euro-American settlement in the bay region, particularly the many adverse changes to the ecology of the Chesapeake and the near eradication of its indigenous cultures during this period.

One of the biggest accomplishments of the volume is its even composition, given the large number of contributors. Once presented, basic contextual information is rarely repeated, and the narrative voice is consistent throughout the book. One can only imagine the editorial acuity needed to achieve such a feat. In addition, *John Smith’s Chesapeake Voyages* has been beautifully produced by the University of Virginia Press. Illustrations abound, many of them in color. The
images of archaeological artifacts and excavations, historic and contemporary maps, pen and ink drawings, and even a few sailing charts handsomely augment the text. The authors also inserted sidebars throughout the book to more fully explain certain important or tangential points, and to put them in perspective for modern readers. Just as importantly, this book reveals the full potential of interdisciplinary scholarship. Among the authors, the fields of ethnohistory, prehistoric and historical archaeology, ecology, and history are all represented. Rather than resulting in a jumble of disconnected facts, interpretations and analyses, however, the authors of this book have managed to integrate information from these various fields into a seamless whole. The result is a most impressive reconstruction of the Chesapeake world in the early seventeenth century.

Given its size (322 pages of text and an additional 80 pages of notes, bibliography, and index), *John Smith’s Chesapeake Voyages* is a surprisingly quick read. (Chapters four and five are an exception, if only for readers who, like this reviewer, can’t resist the temptation to tack back and forth between the wonderfully detailed maps and the equally detailed text recounting Smith’s explorations.) The primary reason for this is the authors’ ability to avoid technical or academic jargon or, when it was necessary to use it, to explain such jargon in plain language. Although there are a few instances of unexplained jargon sprinkled throughout the book (for instance, the discussion of English sailing technology in chapter three), in general non-specialists will have no problems reading and understanding this book.

In addition, the consistent organization of the chapters, and particularly the sub-regional overview chapters, allows readers to skip around to those topics they find most interesting without having to slog through other sections. With only a few minor variations, chapters six through thirteen are organized along the following outline: a section on the environment (including sub-sections on waterways, fishes and shellfish, submerged aquatic vegetation, wetlands, waterfowl, terrestrial vegetation, and terrestrial fauna); a section on native cultures (with subsections devoted to each individual chiefdom or village group, detailing population, villages, and relevant archaeological research); a section on the interaction between native peoples and the environment (including discussions of agriculture, fishing, and trade); and a final section on English penetration into each sub-region and the subsequent impacts to the environment and native cultures over the course of the seventeenth century.

Only two minor criticisms can be levied against this book. The first is that the maps of John Smith’s 1608 voyages and the textual descriptions in chapters four and five do not always match each other. This can be confusing at times, though a likely explanation is simply that the historical record (consisting primarily of Smith’s own later remembrances) is itself occasionally vague and contradictory. The second criticism concerns the third group of chapters. Although one does not
wish to disparage the numerous excellent maps that have been included (far more than in the average scholarly tome), one does occasionally want for more detail. This is particularly the case regarding the various geographical localities mentioned by name in the text (streams, creeks, bluffs, marshes, etc.) but absent from the maps. Even if readers from northeastern Maryland recognize the names of streams and creeks in the chapter devoted to the head of the bay, it seems fair to assume that they will not be as familiar with the streams and creeks of, for instance, the James River drainage (and vice versa).

Overall, however, these are relatively inconsequential drawbacks for such a valuable piece of scholarship. The authors’ passion for the Chesapeake Bay, its people, and its natural resources shines through on every page. *John Smith’s Chesapeake Voyages, 1607–1609* is not just an essential synthesis of interdisciplinary research ably written for a public audience. More importantly, it serves as a timely reminder of all that has been lost to four hundred years of “progress,” and as a powerful call to action to preserve and restore what is left.

Robert C. Chidester
University of Michigan


Maritime historian Donald G. Shomette’s love for sea stories began thirty years ago while reading about shipwrecks in colonial American newspapers on his lunchbreak as a librarian at the Library of Congress. He has brought forth here an absorbing book about the dramatic events in the lives of people at the edge of the sea, specifically the shoally, dangerous waters of the Delmarva coast, between Capes Henlopen and Charles. More than just a local history, the book deals with events that assumed national and even global importance. A few examples may suffice.

The fate of the American Revolution was settled by the Battle of the Virginia Capes in 1781 when a French fleet fought off an English one and blocked the possible escape route of Cornwallis and his army from Yorktown, ultimately forcing his surrender.

During the Civil War the many islands, shallows, and hidden backwaters along the coast provided the small Confederate smuggling vessels refuge from the Union blockade, whose larger ships could not venture closer inshore. In the end, however, the blockaders prevailed and helped save the Union.

Shortly after World War I another event took place off the Virginia capes that foreshadowed an important change in the way future sea battles would be fought all over the world. In a demonstration conducted in 1921, General Billy Mitchell’s
bombers sank the confiscated German cruiser *Frankfurt* and battleship *Ostfriesland*. Though U.S. Navy officials were slow to absorb the lesson, the superiority of airpower over big guns was forcibly driven home later by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor.

In the early months of World War II, underwater attacks by U-boats on U.S. shipping soon left the Delmarva coast strewn with wrecks, raising fears about the outcome of the war. The first U.S. Navy vessel sunk by torpedoes went down off Cape Henlopen on February 28, 1942: the World War I vintage “four-stacker” destroyer Jacob Jones (DD-130) [the reviewer’s father, Carleton Shugg, served aboard her as chief engineer in 1921]. Anti-submarine defenses were poorly organized. Merchant vessels used their radios freely, revealing their positions, and shorefront towns remained lit up, allowing U-boats surfaced at night offshore to fire at passing vessels silhouetted against the lights on shore.

Out of the more than 2,300 vessels listed in his chronological index of those lost from 1632 until 2004, Shomette naturally focuses on the more dramatic events, when ships foundered and their occupants were cast ashore, stories of negligence and heroism, compassion and greed.

In 1785 the three-masted *Faithful Steward*, fully loaded with immigrants, grounded during rough weather four leagues south of Cape Henlopen, while the captain and first mate lay drunk in their cabins. Heroic efforts to launch boats came to grief, and the ship broke up during the night. The beach the next day was strewn with clothing and baggage and bodies. Some of the local inhabitants cared for the survivors, others plundered the dead. Days later in nearby Lewes, a survivor saw a man in the street wearing a vest that once belonged to a member of his family. An estimated 195 people lost their lives in this worst of Delaware maritime disasters.

On December 30, 1958, the 590-foot tanker *African Queen* struck an uncharted submerged hump off Ocean City and broke in two. A multi-service coordinated rescue operation saved its entire crew of forty-five, who then received food and shelter in the gymnasium of the Ocean City Elementary School. Their ship, however, met with less gentle treatment. When all legal rights to the wreck were abandoned by the owners to avoid possible lawsuits from the oil spill, salvagers stripped the ship of her lifeboats and gear, anything of value down to the captain’s clothing and the crew’s personal belongings. But at least these salvagers waited for the legal green light before proceeding.

As Shomette points out, shore-dwellers of the Delmarva Peninsula as elsewhere in the world have often profited illegally from shipwrecks. The history of maritime law regarding salvage of shipwrecks is long and complicated but has dealt mainly with the question of who shall take possession of any valuable property remaining if the rightful owners cannot be located. Of course, deliberate wrecking of ships, using false lights and shifting buoys, has always meant severe
punishment, at least in theory.

The stranding in 1750 of the treasure-laden Spanish frigate *La Galga* on Assateague Island at the Virginia-Maryland line gave rise to an epic squabble between officials of those states over ownership of the wreck, while the scavengers helped themselves. Thereafter, gone but not forgotten, *La Galga* has acted as a magnet for treasure-hunters whose activities, especially from 1980 on, brought them in conflict with maritime lawyers, environmentalists, and marine archaeologists—even Spain itself over ownership rights. One result has been legislation in both Maryland and Delaware (but not Virginia) aimed at preservation of historic shipwrecks.

These and other events in the colorful history of the Delmarva coastline are covered in detail by Shomette in his well-researched and highly readable book, for the browser as well as the scholar.

Wallace Shugg
Baltimore


Colin Calloway is a remarkably prolific historian with wide-ranging interests. His numerous books cover four centuries of American history, from coast to coast and from Mexico to the Arctic Circle. They have won numerous prizes. For example, *The American Revolution in Indian Country* was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. In short, readers have come to expect good things from Calloway. *The Scratch of a Pen*, however, exceeds expectations. One of Calloway’s finest efforts, it combines original research with an elegant synthesis of several large bodies of literature, on revolutionary America, on Native America, on New France and New Spain, packing a very complex story into just 172 pages of gracefully-written, engaging text. The result is a fine addition to Oxford University Press’s “Pivotal Moments in American History” series.

And 1763 was indeed a pivotal moment in American history, not just for residents of the future United States, but for all of North America. Readers coming to *The Scratch of a Pen* with some prior knowledge of the American Revolution will not be surprised to learn that the British triumph in the Seven Years War led to a surge of British patriotism among colonists, and at the same time raised difficult new questions of colonial governance that, when mishandled, led to the independence of thirteen of England’s thirty-plus colonies. The French cession of its North American territories led to conflicts over British colonists’ expansion into the west, over taxes levied to pay for the recent war, and over the question of the relationship between Parliament and the colonial governments now that the colonists no longer had to
worry about the French enemies on their northern and western frontiers.

In Calloway’s hands, however, the significance of the Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the Seven Years War in 1763, was not limited to its connection with the American Revolution. The transfer of New France to the British was also an important turning point in Native American, French colonial, and Latin American history. From 1763–1765 numerous First Nations mobilized to fight “The First War of Independence” —Pontiac’s War—against the British farmers, speculators, traders, and soldiers who had previously been held in check by the French, but who now had serious designs on Indian lands. Along the St. Lawrence River, French residents suddenly had to adapt to their inclusion in the British Empire, raising a set of issues that have yet to be settled. French colonists in the Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley formed new trading networks and communities, such as St. Louis, which were largely beyond the effective governance of any European government. Meanwhile, French Acadians continued their generations-long diaspora, gravitating for the first time in large numbers to Louisiana—which was suddenly a Spanish colony. Other French Louisianans left as the Spanish took over, some of them settling on St. Domingue (soon to become the black republic of Haiti). Spanish residents of Florida, ceded to Britain in 1763, flowed not so much to Louisiana as to Cuba. In the confusion, Crees, Assiniboines, and Ojibwas were drawn from Hudson Bay to the Canadian prairies, Comanches moved southward into what is now west Texas, with ripple effects there, and numerous Native peoples from the Ohio and Illinois countries moved west to the Mississippi River and beyond.

This may sound confusing, but then 1763 was a complicated moment in American history. That is why Calloway’s achievement in this book is so impressive. He weaves together the stories of numerous different peoples, each with its own culture and set of diplomatic and economic interests. He discerns the order amidst the confusion of this tumultuous time; and remarkably, given the need to cover so much ground, his descriptive and narrative passages are surprisingly evocative of North America in 1763. Simultaneously a solid piece of scholarship and an adroit popularization, The Scratch of a Pen deserves a wide readership, one ranging from weekend browsers at the local bookstore, to university students, to professional historians.

James D. Rice
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Book Reviews


“The love of money is the root of all evil.” So wrote the Apostle Paul in exhortation
to his young protégé, Timothy, the eventual first bishop of the church at Ephesus (1 Tim. 6:10 KJV). Even at this early day money was essential, not only to life itself, but to the spread of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire. In a similar vein, money and the church—that of the Protestant variety—is the subject of James Hudnut-Beumler’s *In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar: A History of Money and American Protestantism*. Such a broad title might well conjure up images of a thick and weighty tome, but at 288 pages, Hudnut-Beumler’s book is surprisingly compact for the over two and a half centuries of history that it covers, from 1750 to the present day.

*In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar* is essentially a history of how American Protestants, constrained by an absence of government financing, both raised and spent funds gleaned from their various congregations over time. Hudnut-Beumler, Dean of the Divinity School and Anne Wilson Potter Distinguished Professor of American Religious History at Vanderbilt University, has attempted to view this history through the prism of economics, where “finance, capital, labor, [and] the nature of the firm” (xi) are features of primary attention. Indeed, these features become the major constructs around which *In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar* is built. Of nine chapters, five are devoted to finance, and two each to labor (ministers and their wives), and capital (church-building).

The American Revolution precipitated what Hudnut-Beumler identifies as a great “sea change” in American Protestantism—the disestablishment of state churches. Tax support of religion dried up, in most cases almost overnight, leaving the different denominations to shift for themselves in competition with one another. “The Great Privatization,” as Hudnut-Beumler calls it, “turn[ed] every pastor, however willing or able, into a development officer among his own people.” (15) Placed in this uncomfortable position, the generally well-educated armies of American Protestant ministers were well-suited to begin developing a logic and rhetoric to justify the Christian cause and the reasons Christians should financially give for the benefit of their own neighborhoods and that of the greater world beyond. It is Hudnut-Beumler’s tracing of this intellectual and rhetorical thread found in church-finance publications produced throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that becomes the overarching theme of *In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar*.

Perhaps the most compelling portion of Hudnut-Beumler’s work is his relation of how the ubiquitous terms “tithe” and “stewardship” permanently found their way into the American Protestant lexicon. The author points out that the advocacy of the practice of tithing—giving one-tenth of one’s income to God’s cause—had late nineteenth-century British precedents (50). Building on these, American churchmen around the same time elaborated on this Old Testament concept and united it with New Testament directives, ultimately deducing that the tithe was the *minimum* requirement for Christian giving—in addition to free
will offerings to be made in accordance with how God had prospered an individual (51). At the same time, giving became seen as an act of worship and the weekly offering developed into a permanent institution in the Sunday Service (55). Claiming the tithe as an immutable spiritual law did much—at least in theory—to take the onus of principal fundraiser from the shoulders of the underpaid and over-worked American ministers. Extending far beyond the idea of the tithe, the term “Stewardship” was related to the universal ownership of creation by God, with the temporal custody of this world’s goods distributed by Him to individuals, who were then expected to wisely employ them for His glory. Early writers about stewardship couched it in the larger-than-life language of the Industrial Revolution. Money was seen as Christian potential energy, which, like electricity or dynamite, could be targeted and applied to any of humanity’s ills no matter how large or remote (61, 64, 67). Hudnut-Beumler concludes that although few congregants actually tithed, the preaching of tithing and stewardship “simply moved highly committed and generous church members to become marginally more generous.” (74).

The capitol and labor chapters of In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar pale in comparison when compared to those of finance. Although the author claims a second “sea change” in the transition from the smaller traditional Sundays-only church to the multi-purpose institutional church, such a change might be more of scale than of concept. American church buildings have often historically served as more than just places for Sunday worship. The chapters on minister’s pay and minister’s wives briefly demonstrate that the real pay and prestige of ministers has declined over time, and that the husband-wife team of ministry remains a life of service and sacrifice. One might also raise the question here of whether the classical definition of labor can be justly applied to a spiritual endeavor?

In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar should have been a longer book. Those interested in Maryland history will be disappointed in the dearth of information pertaining to this state with a rich pre- and post-Revolutionary religious heritage. Slavery, the scarcity of hard currency, and the Southern agrarian economy of the antebellum years, and their interaction with Protestantism would also have been fruitful areas of investigation. That being said, Hudnut-Beumler’s In Pursuit of the Almighty’s Dollar, still manages to be a valuable contribution to American religious intellectual history.

Matt Kinnamont
Independent Scholar

Scots in Maryland & A History of the St. Andrew’s Society of Baltimore, 1806–2006. By Christopher T. George. (Timonium, Md.: St. Andrew’s Society of Baltimore, 2007. 268 pages. Cloth, illus., appendices, bibliography. $27.50.)

In the President’s Foreword, Wm. Hay Kommalan states that the book’s objective
is “to place our membership in the community over the last 200 years.” This book is far more than just a rewrite of the society’s minutes (some of which are unfortunately missing). Chapter 1 deals with an overview of the society in Baltimore from 1806 to 2006. Following chapters deal with the role of Scots in Baltimore and Maryland from colonial times to the present, and the role of the society.

Chapter 2, “To a New Land: Scots in Colonial Maryland,” discusses the Scottish prisoners who were transported to Maryland after the English Civil War of 1650 and the Jacobite uprisings of 1715 and 1745, Scottish indentured servants, Scottish merchants, Scottish clergymen, the Scots-Irish, and several specific individuals and families, among them Dr. Alexander Hamilton, Robert Gilmor, the Buchanans, the Stevensons, the Christies of Baltimore County, and the establishment of the First Presbyterian Church in Baltimore. Perhaps this reviewer has a personal interest in this chapter, as he has written about, or is currently researching, or is related to many of the individuals or groups of people discussed in this chapter, and he is happy to say that he has learned something. He knew about the Scots who were transported in 1715 and 1745, but he did not know about the Scots transported by Oliver Cromwell.

In chapter 3, “Forged in Fire: Scots in the American Revolution and the Federal Period,” the author describes the role Maryland Scots and Scots-Irish played on both the Patriot and Loyalist sides.

Later chapters discuss the history, ceremonies, and customs of the society, with biographies of some members. One such ceremony, the Kirkin’ of the Tartans, was begun by the St. Andrew’s Society of Washington, D.C., and by the noted preacher, Dr. Peter Marshall. This ceremony is observed each year at this reviewer’s own church, Perry Hall Presbyterian Church.

Many societies grow, flourish, and die, but chapter 13 discusses the mission for the society in the twenty-first century. In the earlier chapters the author dealt with the past achievements of the society, but here he issues a challenge to present and future members.

Appendix 1 deals with a history of the Fountain Inn, which was bought in 1795 by James Bryden, a “canny Scot,” who came to the United States in the 1780s. The inn was the site of the founding meeting of the society.

Appendix 2 discusses the Gilmor family and Loch Raven, and includes a guide to Scottish links to Maryland place names. Various members of the family have left their mark on Maryland history. The section on Scottish place names could well be expanded into a fuller document at some future date. It is not the intent of this reviewer to “pick holes” in an excellent publication, but he notes one error. Bolton Street and Bolton Hill do owe their name to Bolton, the estate of William Wallace Spence, but the name derives from the parish of Great Bolton, Bolton-le-Moors, Lancashire, original home of the Grundy family, whose descendant George Grundy settled in Maryland, where he died in 1825.
Appendix 3 contains biographies and reminiscences of selected members.

The fifteen-page annotated bibliography lists manuscript sources, newspapers, periodicals and society newsletters, primary sources, and secondary sources. This reviewer notes that one of the many works of David Dobson is included because no other author has done more to chronicle the many aspects of Scottish immigration to the New World. Other works included deal with biographical, genealogical, historical, industrial, military, political, and sociological sources.

Lavishly illustrated with paintings, plats, and photographs of sketches, statues, documents, and tombstones, and documented with a wide variety of sources, the book is informative and a delight to read. Anyone of Scots or Scots-Irish descent and anyone interested in Baltimore or Maryland history will want to own this book.

Robert Barnes
Perry Hall


Lost in many of the general historical accounts of the American Revolution and early Republic, George Daughan observes, is any detailed examination or explanation of the contribution of maritime power to American independence and the early Republic. Implicit in such works is that American naval operations during the War for Independence proved little more than a sideshow. Peace with England exposed the fledgling Continental Navy as a drain on the economy. It was quickly sold off, and for the ensuing decade it was nothing more than an issue which divided Federalists from Republicans. Its reestablishment in 1794, the canon suggests, was nothing more than a temporary expedient.

In If By Sea, Daughan seeks not only to fill the void in the literature but also offers the argument that early American naval operations were not a failed enterprise, but an integral part of the war for independence and critical to the survival of the early republic. In an exhaustively researched and eloquently written narrative, Daughan observes that the muddled origins of the American navy were emblematic of a rebellion led, unsurprisingly, by novices in insurrection. The fundamental problem was what naval force could be established to gain some advantage at sea. The solution came in the form of a loosely-directed naval policy of coastal operations by the provinces, entrepreneurial privateers, and a Continental Navy of converted merchant ships and what few warships the Congress could afford to build. Though individually of questionable success, Daughan points out that the collective efforts of these disparate forces sustained the rebellion until the timely entry of the French, which globalized a limited war and strained Britain’s patience and resources to its
breaking point with Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown.

With independence gained came the realization that the fledgling United States was now on its own as a competitor on the international stage. Though disestablished after the end of war with Britain, the navy survived in conceptual form, an important thread in the political debate that included slavery, expansion, federal power, and sectional interests. That the navy was reestablished over the considerable objections of Democratic Republicans, though, was more than a power play by George Washington’s Federalist Party. Washington realized that independence was a national interest that may have to be defended beyond the coasts. Attacks on American merchant ships by Barbary pirates proved to be the pretext for the rebirth of the navy. And as Daughan points out, the naval service, although never reaching the size or power of European navies, nevertheless became a useful tool to both Federalist and Republican presidents. John Adams secured the navy as an autonomous department and sent warships to the Caribbean to demonstrate to Napoleon America’s resolve to protect its commerce. Thomas Jefferson broke temporarily with his ideological aversion to a standing navy and sent squadrons to the Mediterranean to quell the Barbary pirates. And though Jefferson’s successor greedily eyed Canada as the political objective in the second war with Britain, the United States Navy demonstrated an operational acumen at sea that surprised Royal Navy frigate captains, while American naval victories on Lakes Erie and Champlain ended Britain’s hopes of gaining anything more than a status quo ante at the peace table.

*If By Sea* offers to a general audience an encyclopedic volume of knowledge put together in a readable and coherent narrative. Daughan makes a clear and cogent case that the contribution of America at sea cannot be ignored. Readers familiar with more focused scholarship on early American naval history will find no new interpretations and may take issue with aspects of the book. Daughan characterizes the Continental Congress’s decision to build frigates instead of gunboats, for example, as strategically short sighted. But he ignores the important political strategy that linked international recognition with independence. Only operations in the blue water could send the necessary signal to potential allies that America was serious about independence. In fact, what Daughan might have considered weaving into his narrative is not the navy’s inevitability, but how paradoxical the concept of a navy is in a liberal, democratic nation state. The U.S. Navy’s early history is emblematic of that paradox, an organization more symbolically associated with monarchy than democracy. Americans allowed for a navy, yet limited its strength and scope of operations. Daughan may be right that the place of the navy in early American history has been largely forgotten. What *If By Sea* points out, though, is that the question, “why do we need a navy,” should also be pulled out of the sea chest of naval history.

Craig C. Felker
Daniel Walker Howe begins his story near the end. On May 24, 1844, Samuel F.B. Morse sends the message “What Hath God Wrought” along his newly invented telegraph from the Supreme Court chambers in Washington to his associate Alfred Vail in Baltimore. Within days, the telegraph would be used to report that a Democratic convention assembled in Baltimore has nominated James K. Polk for president. The telegraph, Howe argues, symbolized more dramatically than anything else the communications revolution that would transform American life.

The latest addition to the Oxford History of the United States series and the recipient of the 2008 Pulitzer Prize for history, *What Hath God Wrought* is a majestic survey of the period from the waning months of the War of 1812 to the beginning of the women’s suffrage movement at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848. It is a big book with big ideas. Howe suggests, for example, that the Industrial Revolution was not thrust on American artisans by an antebellum clique of robber barons. Industrialization resulted chiefly from the ingenuity of the artisans themselves. More central to his narrative is the belief that three developments made America more democratic after 1815, the growth of a market economy, the revivals of the Second Great Awakening, and the emergence of mass political parties. “The impact of all three of these forces,” Howe concludes, was “multiplied by new developments in communications” (849).

At the same time, Howe has a marvelous eye for the telling detail. The handshake, he tells readers, replaced the bow in the early 1800s as American society became more egalitarian. Between 1815 and 1845, the average height and life expectancy of native-born white men declined—it was no golden age. The state militias largely disappeared. Never popular, they became politically untenable with the advent of universal white male suffrage. P.T. Barnum, Howe notes, borrowed marketing techniques from the revivalists of the Second Great Awakening. To compare modern televangelists to circus performers does a disservice to the circus.

Howe moves so gracefully from politics to social history and back again that readers may wonder why the two were ever thought to be distinct, but they may find his political history to be the more provocative. Early in the book he eschews the term “Jacksonian Democracy” for falsely suggesting the existence of some partisan consensus. It is a foretaste of what is to come. Near the end, Howe writes, “This book tells a story; it does not argue a thesis” (849). In reality, Howe presents an era bitterly divided between two distinct approaches to politics. The Demo-
crats, led by an imperious Andrew Jackson and later by the disingenuous Polk, are
above all else the party of white male supremacy. Devoted to expansion and devel-
opment over space, Howe’s Democrats are prone to violence at both the personal
and national levels and indifferent to legal norms whether constitutional or inter-
national. Their relentless drive west contributed to the chronic problem of Ameri-
can agriculture, overproduction, and coupled with their commitment to slavery,
set the stage for the Civil War.

By contrast, the Whigs were committed to due process and the rule of law, to
self-improvement and moral uplift, and progress over time. The great Whig Henry
Clay fares better in Howe’s hands than any of the Democrats, but the real hero of
*What Hath God Wrought* is John Quincy Adams, “the quintessential New England
Yankee” in Howe’s words (245), fighting as president for reforms as mundane as a
federal banking law and as visionary as a national observatory, and on his return
to Congress opposing slavery and the Mexican War.

Some will find Howe’s negative portrayal of the Democrats overdrawn. For
all their prejudices, the Democrats, as Howe readily admits, accepted Irish Catho-
lic immigrants into their ranks far more readily than did the Whigs. His conclu-
sion that the Whigs, with their faith in economic modernization, ultimately won
a decisive victory may be open to debate. Imperialism, racism, and lawlessness
seem to be fairly persistent strains in the national character. A few readers may
wonder whether at some level Howe’s notion of a final Whig triumph was in-
tended as a defense against an anticipated charge of present-mindedness. Howe’s
critique of the antebellum Democrats has eerie parallels with contemporary criti-
cisms of the presidency of George W. Bush. Later historians are likely to say *What
Hath God Wrought* was very much a product of its times. Nevertheless, Howe has
produced a brilliant book, one certain to be a standard reference for years to
come. It is a rare author, who, after 855 pages of text, can leave a reader wanting
more.

**Jeff Broadwater**

*Barton College*

*Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia.* By Aaron
Illustrations, tables, maps, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth $34.95.)

For generations, Civil War historians have grappled with the issues of why men
fought and why civilians supported them. These questions have been especially
pointed in examinations of Confederate nationalism, with scholars working to
piece together the ways in which white Southerners created a new nation, rallied
continued support, and persevered throughout four years of hard fighting. Schol-
ars have offered a variety of interpretations for Confederate persistence, but they
have generally focused on either soldiers or civilians without examining the connections between them. In this volume, Aaron Sheehan-Dean attempts to draw these fields together by looking at the integral connections between Virginia soldiers and their families on the home front. In particular, Sheehan-Dean seeks to explain why a wide cross-section of white Virginians, not just slaveholders, supported the Confederacy. Sheehan-Dean posits that, “Virginia Confederates constructed a nationalism built up of nested loyalties to families, religion, communities, regions, the state, and finally the country” (10). This flexible nationalism changed throughout the course of the Civil War, and Sheehan-Dean demonstrates that it was dependent on not only military fortunes and conditions but also on family support and situations.

Using extensive statistical data on Virginia’s soldiers as well as their personal diaries and letters, Sheehan-Dean’s examination demonstrates how Virginia was “both unique and typical of the larger Confederate experience” (8). Sheehan-Dean’s decision to exclude western Virginia, however, may have made the state seem more unified and typical than it was. It also represents a lost opportunity to analyze more fully how the process that unified eastern Virginians failed in the less affluent western counties. Nevertheless, he offers a hypothesis that can be tested for the rest of the Confederate nation. Sheehan-Dean stresses the role of family in a soldier’s decision to enlist, his continued presence in his unit, and his desire for military victory. As have other scholars, Sheehan-Dean uses soldiers’ communications with home as a way of demonstrating their continued dedication to their loved ones and their need for a personal connection with the domestic world.

According to Sheehan-Dean, Confederate soldiers and civilians “built a new culture of sacrifice” during the war (66); one that used civilian hardships and battlefield deaths to bridge the different experiences of Virginians together into a common identity. This culture of sacrifice, with the soldiers’ dedication to the ideals of duty and honor, inspired men to remain on the battlefield. Furthermore, as the war continued and Union destruction of Confederate homes, cities, and landscapes increased, soldiers also cited a desire for vengeance and a need to retaliate for the treatment of loved ones at home for their continued commitment to the military.

*Why Confederates Fought* also explores how the idea of sacrifice shaped the post-war South. Sheehan-Dean argues that Southern soldiers remained dedicated to the ideals of the Confederacy—honor, independence, and racial superiority—throughout the war and even after the military defeat of the Southern nation. In this realm, Sheehan-Dean contends that the experiences of soldiers and civilians often diverged with some soldiers even disdaining “what they characterized as a weak and uncommitted civilian population” (173). Yet, wartime hardships typically brought Virginians and Confederates together and helped
solidify their nationalism throughout the war. Accordingly, even though “by late 1864, it became clear to most soldiers that the Union would defeat the Confederacy” (165), Confederates would not easily let go of their newly formed identity.

Why Confederates Fought helps bridge the gap between civilian and military studies, but does not fully deliver on its premise. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the author does not fully incorporate the family into the story of soldiers on the battlefield. Instead, Sheehan-Dean’s Virginia Confederates are governed more by the idea of family than they are by their actual parents, wives, or children. As a result, Sheehan-Dean misses opportunities to connect Virginia soldiers to recent literature on family, domesticity, and gender. In addition, he frequently oversimplifies historically complex and contentious issues such as democracy, domesticity, nationalism, and hard war. As a result, Why Confederates Fought is filled with many interesting, but largely unsubstantiated insights. Despite these shortcomings, serious scholars of the Civil War and of Confederate nationalism should read Why Confederates Fought.

Lisa Tendrich Frank
Independent Scholar


In the Introduction to For Jobs and Freedom, Robert H. Zieger sheepishly admits to skipping Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I have a Dream” speech in 1963. Just as he saw no role for religion, the young Zieger could not then conceive of the significance of equal employment access in the struggle for civil rights. Historians of the Civil Rights and labor movements have since greatly expanded their scope. This fine synthesis surveys scholarship on the tense relations between African Americans and the predominantly white labor movement since 1865, concluding that rational assumptions—however ill-considered—shaped the actions of both groups.

The seeming incompatibility of American unions and people of color had its roots in the former slaves’ status as a pool of reserve labor. If “the nineteenth-century debate over slavery was a debate about black labor,” then the post-Civil War national dilemma was about black labor suddenly relatively free to make its own choices (2). While southerners coerced African-Americans to stay on the farm, northern employers turned to black workers as a cheap alternative when work was plentiful. Union leaders unwisely strategized that “excluding blacks from membership . . . reduced the pool of available labor. . . . The alternative view—that if blacks were not brought into the union they would constitute a ready reserve of strikebreakers—gained little support” (79). Early unions’ hostility con-
vinced many black workers that their best approach was to operate as free agents, even in a racist system. To these rejected laborers, black clergymen, businessmen, and advocates of racial uplift such as Booker T. Washington did not look so timid when they recommended that “black workers’ best hope for progress was the cultivation of white employers” (91).

Still, significant numbers of African-American workers found their own labor organizations one logical solution. Zieger includes an important overview of African-American unions and work actions. Not surprisingly, the most successful instances of activism took place in geographical or occupational areas where black workers dominated—rice and sugar workers in the late nineteenth-century South, and of course, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, among many others. The author describes how black unionism ultimately enhanced the broader African-American fight for equality, by training leaders such as A. Philip Randolph, demonstrating African Americans’ ability to act collectively, and constantly goading mainstream unions to live up to their ideals.

Between the World Wars, African-American workers took advantage of the new CIO’s efforts to organize biracial unions in mass production industries. Zieger concludes that the CIO’s formation had “critical implications” for black workers, because it “attracted younger, politically engaged activists, many from socialist, communist, or radical union backgrounds” who shared a larger vision of social change beyond the AFL’s parochial wage and hour concerns (113). CIO leaders faced down intense white racism and black skepticism, and employers’ attempts to capitalize on both, to create the first solidly biracial labor coalition in the U.S. By the close of World War II, black union membership had multiplied by a factor of fifteen from that of 1930, tripling the proportion of African Americans among union members (138).

In the postwar United States, labor unions would become one of Civil Rights movement’s most significant allies, at no small cost. The CIO’s social radicalism opened it to charges of communist sympathies. Under fire from “corporate and segregationist enemies” and impatient African-American leaders, AFL-CIO president George Meany managed to mollify white members and attract record levels of African-American involvement (171). The Civil Rights movement increasingly linked workplace justice to social equality in the 1960s, but economic retrenchment in the 1970s and 1980s heralded a period of union retreat that placed racial justice on labor’s back burner. Complex challenges such as affirmative action, the disappearance of urban industrial jobs, and rising unemployment among black youth eroded the briefly successful union of white and African-American workers and continue to bedevil labor and racial justice advocates today.

For Jobs and Freedom skillfully consolidates recent scholarship on the complex and contentious relationships among black and white workers, the Civil Rights and labor movements, and government, business, and unions. Zieger em-
phaizes that “no matter how discriminatory many labor unions were in practice, the ideology of American labor was not racist” (29). It was unions’ failure to live up to their ideals that tragically shut out African-American labor, to the detriment of both.

Elizabeth P. Stewart
Renton History Museum


H. Michael Gelfand, assistant professor of history at James Madison University, has produced an often disturbing picture of the Naval Academy’s attempts to navigate through fifty years of social upheaval following World War II. These years of struggle for racial and gender equality produced presidential orders, congressional legislation, and Federal Court decisions that attempted to erase inequalities of treatment and opportunity in American society. One such measure, signed into law by President Gerald Ford in 1975, specifically opened the nation’s military academies to women. A graduate of Annapolis, Mr. Gelfand painstakingly documents the actions and atmosphere inside this important institution that possessed few resources and minimal desire to accomplish the cultural overhaul dictated by these mandates. The academy’s performance “has been inconsistent,” concludes Mr. Gelfand. “After the initial attempts to increase minority enrollment and to integrate female midshipmen, the academy’s administrators largely ceased to concern themselves with those issues; the various groups were at Annapolis, so what remained to be done?” (216)

In 1948, President Truman ordered the armed forces desegregated. Almost two decades would go by, however, before Presidents Kennedy and Johnson would exert pressure on academy officials to recruit from the African American community. Once non-white applicants were accepted into the ranks of midshipmen, they had to study and compete with their white counterparts in an environment of “racist attitudes, perceptions, symbols, and comments,” writes Mr. Gelfand (68).

In addition to racial tensions inside the academy, Mr. Gelfand discloses that the Navy suffered from a “persistently negative reputation” in the black community (66). Efforts were made to ease the problem, but “Superintendent Thomas Lynch noted in 1992 that poor relations with minority communities continued to plague” the academy’s recruiting efforts (76). “Like American society,” Gelfand writes, “the Naval Academy has work remaining before it has established full representation and participation of minorities and fostered true racial neutrality in its community”(78).
An even more hostile climate of discrimination greeted the first group of eighty-one women admitted in 1976. They and their successors endured continuous verbal abuse, intimidation, sexual harassment, resentment, and isolation by male midshipmen. After four years, twenty-six of the “pioneer” women had resigned. Fifty-five women graduated in the class of 1980, establishing an attrition rate of 32 percent that remained relatively unimproved throughout the years of Mr. Gelfand’s study (236–37). When at the end of the first year, administrators asked the remaining women what advice they would give the next group of female plebes, “the dominant response was ‘Don’t come’”(150). But women and minorities continued to apply and gain admission in increasing numbers. Although Mr. Gelfand’s methodology was to study cultural upheaval from the point of view of the institution, what emerges from his narrative is another story, one of indomitable courage and determination. Over the course of twenty years several thousand minority and women midshipmen, left largely to fend for themselves by academy officials, endured an onslaught of anger, disrespect, and discrimination in order to serve the nation in a leadership capacity.

Mr. Gelfand conducted oral interviews with over three hundred members of the academy community. The accounts lend a personal authenticity to the narrative. Significantly, “The overwhelming majority of the interviewees chose to be anonymous”(221). The atmosphere of discrimination, according to Mr. Gelfand, “appeared to encourage a strong determination to succeed.” One female graduate recalled, “I got to a point where I had to finish, no matter what, no matter what happened or how terrible it was”(148). Minority and female midshipmen believed they belonged at the Naval Academy, believed they had a right to study and compete and achieve. Despite the climate of rejection and acts of harassment that at times approached criminality, those who succeeded in overcoming the rigors of the academy’s curriculum and the negative aspects of its culture, have made a lasting contribution to the institution, the Navy, and society. They have not only achieved positions as officers and leaders, but they also have become role models for those who follow with the same dreams. From the first class of fifty-five graduates in 1980 to the final class of Mr. Gelfand’s study, the annual number of women graduates increased steadily to 134. Moreover, during the same period the number of non-white male graduates (African American, Hispanic, Asian American/Pacific Islander, and American Indian) increased annually from 111 to 160 (236–37).

Mr. Gelfand concludes that the Naval Academy complied with the mandates to integrate women and minorities into the Brigade of Midshipmen. But it failed to achieve an equality of treatment and equality of opportunity. “But when midshipmen who are African American or female face constant racial or gender isolation five decades after the graduation of the first African American midshipman and three decades after the arrival of the first female midshipmen, it becomes clear that the Naval Academy is falling short of its own ideals and of society’s demo-
Racial and gender bitterness were not the only problems besetting the academy during these years. In Chapter Four, Mr. Gelfand details the turmoil surrounding a landmark 1972 Federal Appeals Court ruling in the Anderson v. Laird case, which declared unconstitutional requirements imposed by the military academies forcing attendance at religious services.

In addition to his personal interviews, Mr. Gelfand conducted an exhaustive review of public records, print and electronic media, and documents at the National Archives and Records Administration and the academy’s Nimitz Library. His extensive notes and bibliography offer students and researchers of cultural change, particularly change in hierarchic communities, references to hundreds of sources, including files, reports, correspondence, memoranda, directives, orders, personal papers, books and articles, and studies conducted by Navy and outside reviewers.

It is impossible to visit the city of Annapolis and ignore the presence of the Naval Academy. The 338-acre campus is situated three blocks from the historic Maryland State House. Yet, fortress-like walls, a mission vital to the nation’s existence, and venerated tradition and practice insulate its activities from public scrutiny. It is an institution held in the highest esteem. In the foreword, Senator John McCain describes the academy as “the very soul of the United States Navy” (xiii). For students of the Navy and its academy, as well as readers interested in the city of Annapolis and its history, Sea Change at Annapolis provides an important and readable account of what has taken place behind those walls during a painful period of America’s social history.

Robert W. Tinder
Independent Scholar


The Religious History of American Women is a wonderful addition to the growing literature focused on the impact American women have had on religious organizations and the relationships between female piety and women’s lives outside of religious institutions. Although not entirely successful, this volume attempts to move beyond the perspective that Protestantism had the most significant and long-lasting impact on American culture by including several compelling essays dealing with Roman Catholics. A volume of this length, however, could not capture the experiences of all the religious groups and their traditions across four centuries of American history—a fact that the editor readily acknowledges in her introduction. That being said, contributors to this valuable collection utilize a
remarkable variety of primary sources, such as private papers, diaries, letters, legal records, oral histories, official documents, newspapers, and poetry, to recover American women’s religious history from several different vantage points. Focusing on female agents of historical change, twelve scholars reveal the social, cultural, political, intellectual, and religious dynamics that shaped a diverse American culture. Written at a level that is accessible to sophisticated undergraduates along with graduate students and specialists, knowledgeable Maryland readers interested in American religion and/or women’s history will enjoy this anthology for its larger cultural significance despite the lack of regional case studies and specific references to Maryland.

The book begins with an excellent summary essay by the editor, Catherine Brekus, detailing the historiographic context and the underlying premise of the book to “reimagine” our collective past by placing women and religion at the center of the discussion. The next two chapters, written by widely recognized scholars of New England Puritan women, essentially summarize some of Marilyn Westerkamp and Elizabeth Reis’s extraordinary work. Taken together, these essays provide two very different views of early modern English Protestant women and religion. Emily Clark offers a fascinating glimpse into the lives of eighteenth-century black and white Catholics in Louisiana in chapter three while Brekus’s fourth chapter returns to the initial New England focus. Based upon an intense study of Sarah Osborn’s writing, Brekus helps us “reimagine” the connections between Enlightenment thought and the eighteenth-century Great Awakening. In chapter 5, Janet Moore Lindman asks us to think “Beyond the Meetinghouse” as she uses three case studies of a Philadelphia Quaker, a Virginian Episcopalian, and a Baptist from New Jersey to investigate Protestant spirituality in women’s lives outside their religious institutions.

Anthea Butler presents a particularly interesting argument dealing with black Baptist and Pentecostal women and Susanna Morrill rediscovers the importance of female influence on Mormon theology in chapters six and seven respectively. In chapter eight Kathleen Sprows Cummings challenges us to explore the influence of Progressive Era ideals on American Catholicism. Ann Braude expands upon her powerful essay “Women’s History Is American Religious History” (1997) in chapter nine in which she argues that historians distort the past when viewing the second wave of feminism in purely secular terms. For, in fact, religious beliefs influenced the feminist movement, and the movement had a significant impact on religion. Amy Koehlinger and Kristy Nabhan-Warren provide particularly compelling essays dealing with race and gender entitled “Are You the White Sisters of the Black Sisters?” and “Mexican American Women Redefining Feminism and Catholicism” in chapters ten and twelve. Chapter eleven, Pamela Nadell’s essay “Engendering Dissent,” is the only significant reflection of the Jewish experience included in this collection. A welcome feature of the anthology is an editor’s introduction for each chapter that summarizes the essay and relates it to other
chapters or the book’s main theme.

Brekus’s call to “reimagine” American history through the lens of women’s religious history is laudable. This collection of well-written essays by some of the leading scholars in the field is a welcome contribution to our understanding of American women’s experiences and religious history. And although this reader would have appreciated more photographs and perhaps a sample of the extraordinary primary sources that these scholars used in constructing their essays, all of the chapters are well-worth reading. They provide us with valuable information about gender, religious values and practices, community interaction, women’s environments, family relationships and their impact on American history.

Debra Meyers
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The cordoning off of childhood is a mark of modernity. Modern societies treat their children differently from adults, and that difference takes physical form in the many special objects and spaces of childhood. Scholars are just beginning to acknowledge children as historical actors whose experiences and perspectives augment, and even challenge, the usual “grown-up” understandings of the social world. So too historians increasingly recognize the study of material culture, once a highly specialized domain, as a versatile tool of social analysis. Childhood studies and material culture make a well matched pair. Places and things—the physical organization of children’s hospitals and household compounds, the material stuff of junk playgrounds and snowboards—affirm daily childhood activities for which there may be scant textual records, even as they also suggest much about the social ideologies and adult expectations that structure these experiences. A wonderful addition to Rutgers University Press’s series in Childhood Studies, Marta Gutman and Ning de Coninck-Smith’s capacious new anthology thus combines two relatively new methods of historical analysis to achieve original and insightful results.

Designing Modern Childhoods covers an enormous range in both geography and subject matter—from nomadic schools in Senegal to Anime games in Japan. This diversity emphasizes the enormous differences among children’s experiences, in their levels of autonomy, their access to resources, and in the way that specific societies or historical periods value childhood. Many of the essays trace out such differences. In Harriot Beazley’s essay the experiences of street girls in Indonesia contrast sharply with those of street boys. Abigail Van Slyck demonstrates that while the use and layout of campfires at children’s summer camps may have stayed the same over the course of the twentieth century, the meanings associated with them changed
dramatically. Helene Brembeck notes that the “Hello Kitty” image so popular in the United States and Japan proved a failure in Sweden where “kind toys should smile.”

This careful attention to difference makes the many echoes between these essays all the more powerful. For example, the anthology contains four essays focused on school architecture that read together reveal provocative similarities. That both the Rosenwald schools for black children built in the American South and the new schools constructed in Republican Turkey used a standardized floor-plan and recognizable design to convey specific messages about modernity and equality, not just to the children enrolled there, but to any passerby, suggests larger conclusions about how schools function as modes of social organization that have little to do with education itself. Kristine Juul’s essay on nomadic school’s in Senegal takes this recognition a step further, exploring why nomadic communities might value schools as symbols of political integration even as they find it far more economically and socially useful to send their children out with the herds. Such patterns of “misapplying” what the authorities provide, characteristic of colonialism, proves a frequent strategy for all sorts of children negotiating a world structured by adult prerogatives. This is evident not only in the ways Indonesian street girls scavenge cultural space and identities, but also in the efforts of middle-class London children to manage such embarrassing gifts as Power Ranger pajamas.

The breadth of this collection reveals as well some of the tensions within the field of Childhood Studies. Many of the essays present children as cultural agents, capable of inventing their own meanings and practices, even occasionally disrupting or reorganizing adult norms. The study of an elite Montreal family speaks compellingly about the connecting role the fourteen year old daughter plays in this household. Mizuko Ito’s ethnography of Anime play and communities in Japan finds many adults identifying with this childhood commodity and culture. Conversely, other essays in the collection present children as objects of socialization. Thus, Rebecca Ginsburg details how the structure of the household compound in South Africa, and particularly the servant’s backroom, functioned to teach apartheid. So too debates over what is best for children are evident in the tensions between essays on playgrounds that seek to establish childhood as a time of freedom and exploration and those that trace contemporary anxieties about children in public spaces. Thus questions about the stakes and implications of children’s separateness run through the collection as a whole, beautifully culminating in John Gillis’s elegant epilogue on “The Islanding of Children.” The cover image of children eagerly touching the large globe at the entrance of the Suresnes Open-Air School asserts that Designing Modern Childhoods is not an insular volume. Rather, this book declares children, and the things and spaces of childhood, as vital to understanding the whole world.

Karen Sánchez-Eppler
Amherst College
Landscape and Politics: The Creation of Baltimore’s Druid Hill Park, 1860

David Schley

On Friday, October 19, 1860, an estimated 30,000 people witnessed the inauguration of Baltimore’s Druid Hill Park. Businesses closed and the Stock Board and Corn Exchange took a holiday to permit employees and traders to attend the ceremonies. The inauguration began with a parade of the city’s volunteer military companies, followed by a commencement speech from Mayor Thomas Swann. Press observers commented on the orderliness of the event, and the editors of the Baltimore American noted the good humor of the crowd, stating that to their knowledge “no pocket was picked during the day.” Swann presided over the event from the park’s amphitheater, flanked by “a large number of the most useful citizens of Baltimore” including mayor-elect, George William Brown. The militia parade, formal speeches, and public prayers emphasized the prevailing vision of the park as a genteel setting for bucolic repose.

The mayor’s speech touched on all of the tropes of mid-nineteenth-century park building. He praised Druid Hill for its natural beauty, discussed its anticipated salubrious effects on the city’s population, and avowed that its “cultivated scenery” would elevate the taste and manners of the townsfolk. Baltimore, with 212,418 residents, ranked as the third-largest city in the nation behind its seaboard competitors New York and Philadelphia, and the park would function as an essential counterbalance to its increasing urban density. “Men cannot labor without relaxation,” Swann asserted, promoting the contemporary belief that such spaces functioned as natural oases in the artificial city, providing cultural uplift for the city’s underclass, a pleasant promenade for the upper class, and offering safe recreation grounds for women and children. Park trees would act as “lungs” to purify the polluted city air, and the open fields would serve as a place for exercise and recreation, an escape from urban claustrophobia. As a place for interclass mingling, parks would foster community among an increasingly heterogeneous urban population. More pragmatically, they would increase the land value of adjacent plots, encouraging investment in real estate and boosting property tax revenues. Historians have identified these ideas as hallmarks of the urban parks movement.

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Examining the circumstances surrounding the purchase, adornment, and inauguration of Druid Hill Park demonstrates that although this interpretation of parks and the park movement is not inaccurate, it is incomplete. Local controversies, economic concerns, and schemes for urban development influenced plans for the new park—its design a stunning departure from the small, multifunctional, neighborhood-oriented parks that already dotted the city. Officials had answered cries for open recreation space with plans for this single large park removed from the bulk of the urban population (though convenient to wealthy carriage-owners living in the northern part of the city). Establishment of this park, however, did more than attempt to remedy local problems. In 1860, with Baltimore’s growth stagnant and its reputation tarnished, the city’s elites used this space as an arena for shaping perceptions and defining their hopes for urban development. Examining the creation of Druid Hill Park in these contexts offers historians a window into the late-antebellum intersections of landscape, urban development, and politics.

Druid Hill Park represented an effort at self-definition by a city in the process
of growing, expanding its boundaries, and competing with other urban centers for trade and investment. It was part of a changing vision of urban life, a measure that departed from the preexisting landscape tradition with intentional citywide effects. Its construction, however, represented not only a new perspective on urban life and infrastructure but an approach to dealing with local political tensions, an image corrective to the violent rowdiness associated with Baltimore, and an expansionist measure aimed at signaling the city’s significance as an urban center. The intended beneficiary of the park was not Baltimore’s populace as it was actually constituted but an imagined and idealized population, whose use of the park would follow prescribed guidelines. The city elites who oversaw the purchase of Druid Hill hoped to convince out-of-towners of the reality of their vision of Baltimore.

This paper pursues two paths of analysis potentially fruitful for understanding Druid Hill Park and the parks movement in Baltimore. First, it examines Druid Hill from a landscape perspective, looking at how the park departed from Baltimore’s traditions of urban land use and how these differences affected its use. Second, it looks at Baltimore through a wider lens, analyzing the intended impact of the park on the city’s public image and the controversies that surrounded this municipal project. These questions help illustrate the political and social world of Baltimore on the eve of the Civil War.

Baltimore’s Landscape Tradition

Baltimore’s earliest parks served as aesthetic improvements on essential infrastructure, integrated into the rhythms of daily life. In 1812, the City Council passed and the mayor approved Ordinance No. 25, a measure that unofficially established the city’s park system. The ordinance authorized the commissioners already charged with superintending the City Springs to “make rules and regulations for the preservation of property and other purposes.” With the city’s blessing and funds, municipal workers adorned Baltimore’s watering holes with trees, iron fences, and other hallmarks of small public parks. Nearly a half century later, most of those parks and squares still served as public springs. In his 1858 guidebook, John C. Gobright commented on the quality of water at these public grounds. The water at Union Square was “of most excellent quality,” while Eastern Fountain, “one of our oldest public squares,” produced a “delicious and invigorating stream.”

These multipurpose neighborhood parks constituted the bulk of green space until Druid Hill’s inauguration in 1860, but they did not represent the limits of Baltimoreans’ imagination and ambition. The boundary avenue, proposed in 1851 but never built, was an attempt to use a landscape improvement measure as a tool of urban growth and self-definition. Responding to changes in the new state constitution that had separated Baltimore City from Baltimore County, the mu-
nicipal government decided to celebrate by building a boundary avenue, a tree-lined boulevard ringing the city and marking its territorial jurisdiction. To that end, the mayor and city council created the Boundary Avenue Commission on which local attorney John H. B. Latrobe served as president. The commission found that, given the dearth of public spaces and parks, constructing the avenue would benefit the city. At two-hundred-fifty-feet wide, it could hold “seats and shady walks, so as to serve the purpose of a public park,” and, when intersected by cross streets, would form public squares large enough to accommodate “the thousands who may throng from the densely built portions of the city to avail themselves of the luxuries of fresh air and shade from the trees.” The boundary avenue would also serve as an “axis of improvement” enhancing land value and promoting growth “not only from the center to the circumference, but from the circumference to the center too.”

Such a project necessitated obtaining permission from the state legislature to enlarge the city’s boundaries. Anticipating objections from Baltimore County, the commission in its second report noted that the property lying on the outer edge of the boundary would also grow in value (thus benefiting the county). The group proposed a compromise in which the county could continue to tax and control the sacrificed real estate for an unspecified period of time, after which both taxation and jurisdiction would be relinquished to Baltimore City. Thus the newly independent city could enhance its aesthetic appeal, create a
unique landmark, and augment its territory and its tax base, all with one improvement.

The boundary avenue proposal never advanced beyond the planning stages. Technical difficulties rendered the plan impractical and the county’s representatives in the state legislature declined to cooperate with what they perceived as a land-grab. Additionally, at more than half a million dollars, taxpayers balked at the cost of this proposed improvement. Nonetheless, hopes for a boundary avenue lingered. Swann initially earmarked the streetcar tax for this project as well as for the purchase of a park. A decade after the city purchased the land for Druid Hill Park, the Park Commission cited the boundary avenue plan as the most important conceptual precedent for the city’s first major public recreation ground.8

Baltimoreans continued to make do with the city’s extant open spaces and squares as the boundary avenue debate continued but many grew dissatisfied with the paucity of parkland in their city. Located largely to the east or west of downtown, the Sun wrote of the nine public squares as “oases of green in the midst of red brick and mortar,” in which “troops of children gambol and play.” For larger outdoor gatherings such as picnics, residents left the city for privately-owned grounds.9
By 1860 a groundswell of public support grew and residents agitated for new and improved parks. John C. Gobright, a relentless booster, had to concede that “Our City is not abundantly supplied with public parks.” Public demand for new park space was most visible at the neighborhood level. Petitions circulated from April through September of that year, requesting the placement of parks in various parts of town. Consequently, the city agreed to enlarge Patterson Park in east Baltimore. South Baltimore residents asked for the purchase of Federal Hill for use as a public park, and the councilmen acceded to their request to investigate the matter in September. “The park fever seems to have spread through every part of the city,” the Sun wrote, “and if one-half of the projects now in contemplation are carried out Baltimore will be as thoroughly parked as any other city in the Union.”

Baltimore created Druid Hill Park amidst this “park fever,” but the project constituted a radical departure from the city’s landscape tradition. This expansive park represented a dramatic and wholesale transformation of urban space. The new park, as envisioned by its proponents, would differ from its urban predecessors in both form and function. City residents had interacted regularly with their neighborhood squares, whether using them to gather water or merely passing by in the course of their daily activities. By contrast, the new park, located a half-mile outside the city limits in Baltimore County, sat far from the densely populated neighborhoods. The park’s closest local antecedent, the proposed boundary avenue, promised city-dwellers the fresh air and pleasant interactions of a large, European-style promenade, but not a retreat from the city. Furthermore, the boundary avenue plan included not only a landscape project but a transportation improvement as well, and would facilitate traffic and circulation of goods even as it provided a site of public resort. The large park, on the other
hand, existed outside of the quotidian realities of urban life. A trip to the park would be its own reward.

Mayor Swann had noted in his annual message to the City Council that the “working classes of this city are without the means of recreation so amply provided for in many other cities,” citing New York as a specific example. New York’s work on Central Park stimulated new ideas about the purpose and function of parks. The *Sun* opined that “cities have outgrown the notion of ‘parks’ surrounded by bricks and mortar,” and added that Baltimore should “emulate the style of New York.” The need for a large park signaled that the city had passed its infancy and as a polity they could as well “take the air under charge of a nurse in petticoats and pantalettes.” Central Park signaled New York’s sophistication and maturity as an urban center, and constituted an advantage in the interurban competition for trade. The *American* noted that, in addition to serving the residents of New York, Central Park attracted businessmen to the city, and “induce[d] them to purchase their dry goods and groceries in the city which can show them a park not to be equalled outside of Europe.” In building Central Park, New Yorkers created an improvement of use to all, the effects of which stretched far beyond Manhattan.

Although the idea of a large park came from New York, Baltimore’s transit system ultimately made such an improvement both viable and desirable. Streetcar tracks, first laid in Baltimore in 1859, already facilitated the city’s development and expansion. The City Passenger Railway Company brought previously inaccessible areas within scope and forged new links between neighborhoods as it decentralized the city. Prior to their introduction to the city, Mayor Swann noted that “[p]ublic opinion” had long ago recognized the crucial role transit facilities played in “bringing together and consolidating the population of all large cities.” With the introduction of regular omnibus service, “All parts of the city became centralized and knit together by this improved mode of transit.” The experience of other cities showed that streetcars would have an even greater effect. An integrated transportation system would promote a sense of common identity among a large and heterogeneous population by allowing easy movement through, and thus knowledge of, the various parts of their city. “Now that the City Passenger Railways offer a fine ride to the city limits, in pleasant cars and at a moderate fare, we may expect that the community generally will soon know much more about the city they live in than they do at present,” the *American* opined after the streetcar lines had opened.

Baltimoreans’ patterns of movement on the streetcar were shaped as much by the legal and social limitations of this new mode of transport as by its technological advantages. The state legislature, concerned with ownership details such as “foreign” financing (Philadelphia) did not incorporate the City Passenger Railway Company until 1862. The delay limited track extension to the city line. Without the state’s assent, the CPR could not function as a corporate entity outside of the
Baltimore, forcing its tracks to stop at the city line. If politics restricted the physical reach of the streetcars, class and race limited their ridership. The nickel fare eventually adopted was, the press complained, expensive for the common laborer. Racial restrictions imposed greater limits. Although the company’s charter did not specifically ban African Americans from riding the cars, local custom held that they could only travel standing on the front platform. Within these geographic and social parameters, the streetcar promised to alter patterns of urban life.

For the park’s proponents, the rapid and convenient movement of people within the city on the City Passenger Railway cars made the idea of a lesser local park inadequate. In 1859, Mayor Swann had commented that Baltimore’s deficiency in public squares, unique among the large cities on the eastern seaboard, could not be remedied by the “establishment of public squares of limited extent in the heart of the city”:

The masses of the people require a place of recreation, where, during the periods of leisure, they can enjoy, with their families, enlarged space and pure air. The introduction of passenger railways, running to our remotest suburbs . . . suggests a revival of this subject, and the establishment . . . of a public park of two or three hundred acres, in a convenient location, at the terminus of one or other of the lines of railway proposed to be established.16

The Sun and American agreed. “With facilities of travel we are undergoing an
expansion of ideas on the park . . . the people of Baltimore are not likely to fritter away their enjoyment upon half a dozen acres of turf,” wrote the Sun. 17 The American emphatically noted a correlation of transportation facilities with park improvements. Shortly after the inauguration of Druid Hill Park, the American editorialized that now, with “such an unequalled place of resort, it should be our aim to show it to all who come to the city, and this can in no way be so well done as by means of easy transportation to the locality,” adding, “[a] park without a railway is as bad as a watch without the hour hand.” 18

With Baltimore’s streetcars channeling passengers through the city, the park would be a primary point of congregation, a common destination that could help unify the population and represent the character and interests of the city to outsiders. Inaugurating the park, Mayor Swann suggested that public parks were sites where “social intercourse may be cultivated, and strangers brought in occasional contact with each other.” The American editorialized soon after that a “large Park, like that of Druid Hill,” could serve “the great mass of the community” and as such was “an absolute necessity for all large cities.” It would provide common ground for all the city’s inhabitants: “It ought to be, nay it will be, their place of general assemblage.” 19

The unique funding scheme for Druid Hill reinforced the symbiosis of streetcar and park. In lieu of a tax on property, streetcar fares were set at a nickel, one cent of which went to the city’s Park Fund for the purchase and adornment of one or more large parks. In 1859, the editors of the Baltimore American first articulated the idea of what later became known as the “Park Cent” as the city council prepared to authorize a private franchise to build and operate horse-drawn streetcar lines. They suggested that the city tax a portion of the streetcars’ gross receipts in exchange for right of way. Other cities, such as New York, had sold the franchise rights quickly and cheaply. Baltimore, though a latecomer to the streetcar business, could use this new service for its own development and become the first city to extract a revenue stream from the publicly-authorized but privately-run cars. The American had also separately advocated the purchase of a large park for the benefit of the public. On March 11, a letter to the editor signed “Public Improvement” combined the park and streetcar tax ideas, suggesting that the franchise terms should mandate a four-cent fare, of which one cent would be set aside for the purchase and adornment of a park. 20

The city council’s original streetcar bill did not provide for a park cent, and Mayor Swann vetoed the draft on March 22. The city’s control of its streets, Swann argued, was its most important prerogative, and should not be surrendered without compensation. Accordingly, he proposed modifications to the existing bill that provided a five-cent fare, one cent of which would go to the city’s coffers specifically for the purchase and improvement of a large park and the construction of the long-proposed city boundary avenue. 21 The city council passed a revised bill incorporating Swann’s suggested amendments, among them the pro-
posal that revenue derived from the park cent was to go towards the creation of a large park, one that could rival if not exceed New York’s Central Park. With four to five hundred acres, and accessible by cheap transportation, it would “furnish an occasional retreat to those whose engrossed pursuits or straitened circumstances confine them at all seasons of the year within the limits of a crowded city,” Swann stated in an address to City Council early in 1860.22

Six months later, with the streetcars operating and funds accumulating in the park fund, the city council passed a resolution in which they asked the mayor to appoint four people to a park commission. Those chosen would work with Swann, without compensation, on selecting the site (or sites) for one or more large parks. Four members of the industrial and commercial elite accepted the positions, William E. Hooper, a cotton duck manufacturer, Robert Leslie, a shipping merchant and vice president of the Board of Trade, Columbus O’Donnell, the aged president of the Gas Company and former Baltimore & Ohio Railroad executive, and John H. B. Latrobe, a prominent attorney who served as counsel to the B&O, and had previously presided over the Boundary Avenue Commission.23 On June 15, the commission printed a notice requesting proposals from interested landowners “willing to dispose of their property for a PUBLIC PARK.” The lot should, they said, “contain about five hundred acres of land, and be located as near as practicable to the city limits.” Interested parties were requested to give the asking price, and describe the conditions of the land and its distance from the city boundary.24 The commission received a number of offers and conducted on-site investigations over the course of several days in July.

The commission established criteria for desirability of a new park site that reflected its intended function as a place for recreation and relaxation in the increasingly crowded city. They looked for a densely wooded site with a good water supply and undulating terrain so as to create scenic vistas for visitors on walks or carriage drives, few buildings, sites for athletics including cricket and baseball fields, and parade grounds.25 The commissioners eliminated some proffered sites based on factors such as excessive distance from the city, costliness, inadequate acreage or coverage of trees, and other aesthetic concerns.

One of the apparent shortcomings in selecting Druid Hill, the absence of a natural water source, soon took shape as an opportunity for the future development of the city and the park. Monies in the Park Fund could also be used for upkeep and ornamentation. Using these funds, the city could build a large artificial lake that would, much like the earlier city spring improvements, beautify the park and supply water for the city. As the commissioners reported, “One of these lakes would cover an area of 25 acres, being on the site of the reservoir contemplated in the water survey in the event of Gwynn’s Falls being used to supply the city.”26

Upon determining their preference, the members of the Park Commission
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proceeded to purchase Druid Hill, though not without some difficulty. The property had been the country estate of Lloyd N. Rogers, son of Revolutionary War Colonel Nicholas Rogers. The elder Rogers had laid out the grounds, and his son had maintained the estate. The commission’s arrangement with Rogers specified that he would receive $484,000 in city stock in exchange for his land. Their efforts to acquire the estate stalled briefly when Rogers’s attorney advised him that the city did not have authority to purchase land outside its boundaries, and he threatened to renege on the agreement. When the city threatened legal action, Rogers accepted a modified arrangement by which he received $121,000 of his payment in cash and took the originally proffered stock for the rest. The commissioners turned to their own pockets and those of the industrial elite to raise the lump sum. Every member bought $10,000 in park stock from Rogers, as did philanthropic financier Enoch Pratt, former B&O president Chauncey Brooks, and five other wealthy individuals. The city assumed title of the land on October 1, 1860.27

With the site under municipal control the commission asked Howard Daniels, a landscape gardener and architect, to improve the park grounds and prepare them for the public, a relatively simple task as the Rogers’s estate was already in park-like condition. In what may have been a jab at Olmsted and Vaux, Daniels wrote, “With half a million dollars and a skilful landscape gardener, Druid Hill can be made the best Public Park in the world, and better than the New York Central Park will ever be.”28 He employed seventy-two men to conduct the necessary improvements to ready the park for its inauguration on October 19, 1860, and then continued the modifications with a reduced workforce.29

Although improving the park necessitated a wide range of alterations to the
landscape, Daniels and the commissioners determined that their principal task was to construct roadways and thus make the park suitable for carriage travel, a controversial emphasis. In their fourth annual report, the Park Commission noted that although necessity compelled them to devote much of their effort to repairing and opening country drives, “the remark was not unfrequently [sic] made, that little or nothing had been done for the comfort and pleasure of pedestrians.” By 1864, the commissioners retorted that the construction of the pavilion (which would shield parkgoers from rain and offer concessions) and the building of a promenade answered those concerns. Such belated emphasis on facilities for pedestrians suggests that the commissioners favored the genteel activities of wealthier visitors. Of the 723,133 visitors who passed through the park’s Main Gate (the principal entrance for Baltimoreans) from 1861 to 1864, 464,649 arrived on foot, 64 percent of the total. By contrast, thirty percent came through in single-or double-horse carriages and the remainder on horseback.

For the majority of Baltimoreans, a visit to Druid Hill Park was an occasional indulgence rather than part of a daily routine. The diary of B. Adelman, later a Confederate soldier from Maryland, shows the patterns of at least one person’s use of the park. From May 2 to September 21, 1862, he recorded four visits (or promised visits) to the park. In one case he went out with friends after dinner and in another he went for a “Grand picnic.” On two other occasions, he arranged to go with possible love interests. Adelman’s pattern of park use differed from that of most Baltimoreans in that he recorded just one Sunday visit. Thomas Swann’s successor, Mayor George William Brown, suggested that the park would be of little use to the “large proportion of the population . . . compelled to labor constantly in some form or other for their support, and have but one day of rest in seven” unless the City Passenger Railroad ran on Sundays. To that end, he recommended permitting the streetcars to run “on a portion of that day, during the proper season of the year. I believe that this permission will not lead to a neglect of the religious observance of the day, but that it will tend to improve both the health and morals of the people.” Weekly exposure to the ameliorative effects of nature and outdoor recreation, he suggested, would be sufficient to refresh and rejuvenate the city’s working poor.

After its inauguration, newspaper editors across the country hailed Druid Hill Park as a beautiful addition to the city of Baltimore. The New York Herald wrote that that the “Monumental City is going ahead, its railway facilities have improved its trade wonderfully, and Baltimore bids fair, at no distant day, to outstrip Philadelphia. The new Park will do more than the Police in preserving public order.” The St. Louis Evening News congratulated the city on its accomplishment, “How we envy the Baltimoreans, happy dogs, in the priceless heritage they possess!” The park received accolades for decades as an exemplary space, particularly by those trying to institute similar facilities in their cities. “Druid Hill
Park is one of the finest public grounds in this country,” gushed the Providence Public Parks Association in 1887. “It possesses all the essential features of a magnificent park, such as lawns, forest, wilderness, lakes, glens, and meadows.”

Yet as the Herald’s comment suggested, praise for Druid Hill Park remained inseparable from comments on the city’s reputation as a haven of violence and disorder. A common theme in the coverage of the park’s inauguration by out-of-town newspapers was that Druid Hill would help deliver Baltimore from its reputation as a site of danger and disorder, one that had continually marred the city’s reputation. “No city in the world has more thoroughly redeemed the good character which it possessed for many years, and which for a few years it was in so imminent danger of losing permanently, as Baltimore,” wrote the Philadelphia Inquirer. The city had “regained the confidence of the country at large” through the election of “persons pledged to the restoration of order” and the purchase of their park. Members of the nativist American Party (the Know-Nothings) sat in the city government seats that created Druid Hill and in their four years in office had embarked on a costly project of infrastructural expansion and municipal reorganization. They had achieved the power to do so, in part, through the use of violent “political” gangs, who intimidated and attacked voters foolhardy enough to approach a polling place with a Democratic ticket. Baltimore’s violent elections, the best-remembered feature of the city’s four years of Know-Nothing rule, influenced both the motives for and the opposition to the creation of the park. Promoters believed that the landscaped retreat would promote an alternative vision, one that cast the city as a genteel and sophisticated urban center.

Druid Hill Park and the Image of the City

The opening ceremonies on October 19 promoted a vision of Druid Hill Park as a site of polite interaction and good order, though this interpretation did not go unchallenged. Baltimore’s notorious street gangs did not attend the inauguration. Rather, the respectable embodiments of armed power, the city’s volunteer military companies, displayed their martial prowess in a parade on the new public grounds. As the soldiers marched, a young boy, munching “a turnip of unusual dimensions” walked astride their column, and took position in their ranks. When an officer upbraided him he quipped, “[Isn’t] the Park . . . as much mine as your’n, and ain’t I got a right to be here?” The American commented, “It is unnecessary to say that this juvenile opinion of the rights of people was received with a shout of laughter.” Although the park did serve as a place of leisure within the city limits, the “rights of people” did not include unfettered freedom of action and participation, as this precocious youth had assumed.

Druid Hill did, however, offer an orderly recreation spot for those who desired to partake in the activities that the park facilitated. In July 1861, in the tense aftermath of the Pratt Street riot and the subsequent military occupation of the
city, the Park Commission devised and published a list of regulations concerning the use of Druid Hill Park. This attempt to police park goers may have stemmed from Druid Hill’s wartime function as an encampment for Union soldiers stationed in Baltimore. Among the regulations, a variety of activities carried a five-dollar fine, such as discharging a firearm, vandalism, or fastening a horse to a tree. More broadly, the commission declared that “If any person shall commit a nuisance, or any offence against decency or good morals, such person shall forfeit and pay not less than Five, nor more than Fifty Dollars, for every offence.”

The new park prescribed certain types of behavior and circumscribed others. The commission permitted organized sports but prohibited chasing squirrels. Climbing or swinging from a tree carried a five-dollar fine. Schools could hold picnics, but only with permission, and alcohol was strictly prohibited. Visitors could not swim in the lakes and the commission specified that “If any person shall Foul in any manner any Spring or Branch, such person shall forfeit and pay not less than Five, nor more than Ten Dollars.” These regulations were designed to create a peaceful park, a refined setting for bucolic repose.

The park commissioners commented with pleasant surprise on their patrons’ well-mannered use of the park and reported in 1861 that they had rarely had to enforce a regulation. The most common offense, carriage speeding, was only an occasional nuisance. One policeman working with two assistants preserved the public order and disproved initial concerns that policing would be “a source of heavy expense.” They attributed attendee’s good behavior to a recognition that “the Park is their [public] property, and that each individual is personally interested in the preservation of order within its limits.” For the next several years, the relative absence of criminal activity appeared as a recurring motif in the commission’s reports. In 1864 they compared their experience with that of New York, “Were such a police required here as throngs the Central Park of New York, Druid Hill would have to be either abandoned altogether, or assumed as a regular burden upon the public.”

What criminal activity they did notice in the park stemmed primarily from ignorance and thoughtlessness. Landscape gardener Howard Daniels conceded that many of the transgressions, such as picking flowers or “mutilating of the limbs of trees and shrubs,” were occasionally the product of “vicious intentions.” The solution to accidental abuse, he believed, lay in employing police for the “diffusion of correct notions. . . . The influence of the better class of citizens, both through example and precept, should be brought to the aid of the Park authorities, in impressing upon the thoughtless and careless the duty of enjoying the Park without abusing it,” he added. The prevention of trespass and depredation required a boundary fence. Without one, he said, “there can be no safety for the public property and no efficient surveillance or police of the Park.” Enclosing the grounds would allow city authorities to control access to the park and thus ensure its proper use.
The park’s location, distant from the bulk of the population, helped determine which Baltimoreans would make it to the gates and how frequently they might visit. The streetcar, as the principal means of accessing the park, served as a filter for certain elements of the population, rendering explicit regulation unnecessary. As noted above, African Americans had restricted access to streetcars. From the chartering of the City Passenger Railway Company in 1859 until 1870, black travelers were forced to ride outside the car, standing on a platform, regardless of the availability of seats within. When, in 1870, this practice was challenged, the attorney for the streetcar company protested that a regulation “admitting negroes to ride along with white persons, would not indeed have been tolerated in 1859.” He added that “the accommodation hitherto afforded on the front platform has been found quite adequate to the wants of all the colored persons who really desire to make use of the cars.” Although not impossible for black Baltimoreans to ride the streetcar to Druid Hill Park, this public ground stood at the very end of the line, and would have required a lengthy ride standing up for anyone.

Regardless of race or ethnicity, the nickel fare for a ride on the streetcar posed an obstacle for poor Baltimoreans who wished to visit the park. The Sun and its correspondents decried the park cent as a regressive tax on the poor. “The working people, the masses, expect to use [the streetcars] for business and pleasure,” and the
tax would fall “upon them more heavily than all.” Until the creation of a connecting line in 1863, streetcar riders also faced the inconvenience of a half-mile walk from the city limits to the park’s gates, a factor that posed challenges for the sick and injured and for all streetcar riders visiting the park in the event of a sudden thunderstorm. The park’s outlying location meant that a visit required advance planning and the commitment of a nickel to pay for the trip.

The commission’s rules of conduct and visitors’ patterns of use differentiated Druid Hill from other public spaces in and around the city. As previously noted, privately-owned picnic grounds had long served as the sites of large gatherings, and the newspapers had reported several incidents of disorderly characters and thuggish behavior. For example, unidentified thugs attacked a group of school children and their parents at one such picnic site. The families had gathered “for the purpose of enjoying the innocent, rural sports of the day, and breathing the pure atmosphere of that region.” The American reported that “during the day several of the parties were attacked and persons were beaten.” Although the press did not use these “pic-nic riots” as a rationale for building a public park, the last five of the thirty regulations that the commission passed governed the use of the park and addressed picnickers and their conduct. In providing a safe ground for recreation, Druid Hill functioned as a counterpoint to the disorderliness of other places of resort.

The pastoral calm of Druid Hill stood in starkest contrast to the disorder in the city’s streets. During the months that the commission worked on selecting a site, the American confidently predicted that rowdies would “not be likely to select such a place as a scene for their escapades or vulgar frolics. . . . The presence of the refined and orderly portion of a population will always operate as a check upon those of a different stamp, even in the absence of police arrangements.” Mayor Swann, in inaugurating the park, remarked upon the “transition from the busy and crowded streets which you have just left.” As in other major American parks, both the pastoral setting and curvilinear course of the park paths and roadways contrasted with the rigid gridiron of the city’s streets. In the eyes of some observers, though, the same parties responsible for creating the park likewise bore culpability for the disorder in the streets—namely Mayor Swann and the Know-Nothing city government.

The mayor protested the accusations of lawlessness and upon accepting his second nomination as the Know-Nothing candidate for the mayoralty in Baltimore in 1858, the incumbent Thomas Swann complained of persecution in the press for staying true to the American Party cause. The mayor, he complained, received all the blame for crime and disorder, adding that the city did not deserve this singular reputation when crime levels compared with those of other large municipalities. Swann’s exasperation, if genuine, demonstrated a misreading of Baltimore’s criminal reputation. The supposed originators of the violence, more than the violence itself, sullied the port city’s image.
The election riots of the 1850s and the associated political gangs shocked many outside observers and members of the press. Violations of democratic principles and electoral decorum earned Baltimore widespread infamy. The Philadelphia *Inquirer* informed its readers of the park’s inauguration and placed it in the context of this violence. “The wretched farce, to which the system of popular elections was reduced, is fresh in the memory of all our readers.”⁴⁹ Political gangs, with colorful names such as the Blood Tubs, Rip Raps, and Plug Uglies, had come to symbolize Baltimore for many outsiders. A correspondent to the *American* noted that when he had tried to drum up trade for Baltimore in the South, he had been frequently informed that their business had already gone to New York. “Some made merry at our expense,” he said. “They would jeeringly ask, Where is Baltimore? They had only heard of it as a place where Plug-Uglies and Blood-Tubs spent the days and nights in cutting each other’s throats.”⁵⁰

For their part, the Know-Nothings maintained that the Baltimore elections held under their administrations were no more violent than earlier contests between Democrats and Whigs. Regardless of its origins or purposes, reports of the electoral violence reached a wide audience. Druid Hill Park, built in part to ameliorate the city’s wounded reputation, was initiated and constructed by the politicians responsible for inflicting that wound.⁵¹

This irony fueled the *Sun*’s opposition to Druid Hill Park. The paper, a Democrat-leaning penny press, declared its opposition to the park the moment the commissioners chose Lloyd Rogers’ estate for the new park. Although the *Sun* had theoretically favored the creation of a large park, its editors contended that this site had been undemocratically selected and purchased illegally. Much of the controversy centered on Druid Hill’s distance from the city line. “It is admirably suited to the convenience of one class of the community, and as far removed as possible from the other . . . [W]hen a system of legislation is pursued and the exercise of authority directed in such a way as to . . . involve the poor in servile tribute to the rich, the thing is odious in the extreme.”⁵² Such ignominious legislation, the paper asserted, resulted from the scandalous and undemocratic manner in which the current administration had obtained power. The paper opined that Druid Hill was more suited to the:

aristocracy. . . [D]uring the late lawless usurpation of the “clubs,” our municipal officers were, politically speaking, “aristocrats,” their patent nobility and credentials of office not being derived from the people at large, but enjoyed under favor of the “Plug-Uglies,” “Tigers,” “Blood Tubs,” “Black Snakes,” &c.

The mayor and city council owed their power to these political clubs, a situation that left most ordinary citizens voiceless.⁵³ The Park Commission, though “composed
of respectable and intelligent men, [were] representatives of the aristocracy exclusively.” In the end, “[t]he people . . . powerless, and the citizens of Baltimore have had no more to say upon the subject [of the park], than the people of Paris would be suffered to say with regard to any project of the Emperor of France.”

The debate over the park acquisition continued in the press, up to and beyond Druid Hill’s inauguration. “[W]e maintain that the whole transaction is as lawless, worthless and shameful as any other of the outrages which have dishonored our city. . . . We may take a stroll in Druid Hill Park any day, but shall we consent to the illegality by which it is brought into the service of our city?” (The answer, of course, was no.) The Sun also targeted the partisan motivations of the city government in initially scheduling the inauguration for October 8, two days before the municipal election. The government appeared to be reaching out to voters who had shunned the Know-Nothings earlier and an attempted reconciliation with wealthy Baltimoreans alienated by city government’s heavy expenditures yet well-positioned and able to enjoy the park. Uncharacteristically for a Know-Nothing, Mayor Swann had invited French, German, and Italian groups to the park inauguration in addition to the commercial and industrial elite. Yet, the Sun noticed, unlike earlier events that “American associations” had not been invited. Where, the paper asked, “are the Plugs, the Blood Tubs, Black Snakes, the Tigers, now? Why are they not preparing banners ‘damning the Dutch,’ and muskets, ‘bob-tails,’ revolvers, billies, knives, awls—all for a grand characteristic display on this eventful occasion?”

Ultimately, the editors worried for naught over the partisan effect of the inauguration—heavy rain forced the cancellation of the ceremonies, and organizers rescheduled the event for October 19. Nine days earlier, on October 10, operating under state-imposed election regulations and under the guidance of a state-appointed police force, the Democratic surrogate City Reform ticket handily won the municipal election. Yet even with this victory the paper maintained that the city had illegally purchased Druid Hill. Those residents who saw the park as an essential improvement for the city’s economic well being and reputation regarded the objections as perfidious.

The American typically aligned with the Know-Nothings on urban issues. In reference to the Sun’s opposition to the Druid Hill purchase, its editors prayed that “a miserable spirit of petty jealousy and of unreasoning prejudice is not permitted to destroy [the park].” A large park would favorably position Baltimore in intercity rivalry for investment, tourists, and residents. “The establishment of this Park will at once make [the city] a point of interest,” declared Mayor Swann at the park’s inauguration, adding that it would “give a reputation to our city abroad.” With these considerations in mind, some perceived that those who criticized the park also opposed the city’s interests.

The American warned against excessive miserliness, citing expensive but neces-
sary recent improvements in the fire department and waterworks. Public projects remained essential to the city’s growth and cohesion. “If we have faith in the oft reiterated belief that Baltimore is to become a great city, it must be shown by those public improvements and enterprises which are distinctive characteristics of a metropolis.” To this end, “a grand city park, conceived in an enlarged spirit and fostered with a wise liberality” would be “the boast of our city.” Such projects, “healthful symptoms of growth and prosperity,” ought to be encouraged. The fate

O.W. Gray, Map of Baltimore, 1876. Note Druid Hill Park on the upper left.
of the city rested in the hands of its industrial and political leaders. “We have enough capital, enough natural advantages—have we enough enterprise?”

Thomas Swann’s inauguration speech touched on ideas of the park as a salubrious recreation ground for the crowded masses, but the thrust of his address centered on its use as a distinctly urban improvement. “The growth of cities depends upon promptness and energy in the development of resources which they may be found to possess. The age we live in is an age of progress. To falter or hesitate would be weak and humiliating,” he opined. His administration had seen Baltimore’s “public edifices increased, important works of improvement either entered upon or brought into successful use, and confidence in its own great destiny strengthened and confirmed.” He continued, “I have seen the city of Baltimore take her stand, in all that relates to the prominence and dignity of her position, among the proudest cities of the seaboard.” This logic, presented to the public, cast the creation of the park as one part of an integrated plan to expand the city and foster progress as Baltimore edged toward an uncertain future.

Conclusion

Studying an improvement such as Druid Hill Park exposes the motivations and goals of the nineteenth-century parks movement as well as the complex local factors at play in the creation of these new urban institutions. Concerns about the health and want of recreation for the working classes recurred in the debates over the park. With streetcars facilitating movement to all corners of the city, the press and municipal officials argued that a large park removed from the bulk of the population could nonetheless serve the people, regardless of the fact that streetcar fares and regulations limited ridership. Discussions about the park lay centered in the context of interurban rivalry and the need to provide for Baltimoreans what New Yorkers already possessed. Announcing the acquisition and opening of a large park was tantamount to announcing that Baltimore too was a sophisticated urban center and acted to ameliorate the city’s reputation. Purchasing, landscaping, and opening a park for polite public use allowed officials to present an alternative vision of their city, one that counteracted the bloody riots that had assured their election and provided an alternative urban space to the crowded and crime-ridden streets. Druid Hill promoted a vision of Baltimore as a city inhabited by hardworking (white) families whom this recreation ground would serve, while effectively erasing from public view the substantial segments of the population who could not easily take advantage of the park’s facilities for a want of cheap and commodious transit. But no supply of stately oak trees or shaded carriage paths could elide the park’s political provenance, and the location and means of funding were both scrutinized in the press.

The advantages of the park, its benefit for the local population, its ability to attract tourists and businessmen, its function as an orderly space in an often dis-
orderly city, all ultimately related to its ability to help Baltimore grow and develop as a city. With a healthy population, inflow of capital, and positive reputation, it would be easier for Baltimore to advance relative to Philadelphia and New York. Without a park, the city might well fall behind. Even its location, northwest of the city boundaries in rural Baltimore County, speaks to a municipal vision of expansion and growth. “We must prepare for a period,” Thomas Swann declared, “when swarming multitudes will settle around this Park, when the noise of the hammer and the smoke of the furnace and the workshops will invade its most tired places.” Although Baltimore City lay to the south of the new park, trees and rural dwellings encircled the western, northern, and eastern boundaries. In preserving those five hundred acres of forest, the city claimed a stake in the rest.

NOTES

1. New York Times, October 20, 1860; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser (hereinafter cited as American), October 20, 22, 1860; the inauguration was covered at length the American, October 20, 1860, including the full text of Mayor Thomas Swann’s speech. This was reprinted as Inauguration Ceremonies and Address of Hon. Thomas Swann on the Opening of Druid Hill Park, October 19, 1860 (Baltimore: Bull and Tuttle, 1860); in this essay, I refer to the October 20 issue of the American. The Sun mentioned the inauguration, but only briefly.


4. Board of Park Commissioners, 44th and 45th Annual Reports to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (Baltimore: Wm. C. Dulany, 1905), 153; John C. Gobright, The Monumental City, or Baltimore Guide Book (Baltimore: Gobright & Torsch, 1858): 58–59. These small fountain squares continued to be part of Baltimore’s urban landscape for decades even after the opening of Druid Hill Park, see for example the description of Baltimore by an unknown visitor, March 3, 1880, in the Maryland Historical Society (hereinafter MdHS), Special Collections, Vertical File; Raphael Semmes, Baltimore as Seen by Visitors, 1783–1860 (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1953): 104.


6. Commissioners on City Boundary Avenues, Report of the Board of Commissioners to the Mayor and City Council, Relative to the City Boundary Avenues (Baltimore: James Lucas, 1852), 8–10.

7. Ibid, 11–12; Commissioners on City Boundary Avenues, Second Report of the Board of Commissioners Relative to the City Boundary Avenues (Baltimore: J. Robinson, 1853), 10.

8. Olson, Baltimore, 135–36; Gary Lawson Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789–1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 211; J. V. Kelly, Public Parks of Baltimore, No. 4: Druid Hill When Purchased by the City ([s.l.]: [s.n.], 1929): 9–13; Ninth Annual Report of the Park Commission of the City of Baltimore to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (Baltimore: [s.n.], 1869): 303–304; even in 1869 the commission expressed hope that the boundary avenue would yet be completed.

9. Sun, April 14, 1860; number of public squares in the city and their distribution deduced from William Sides, Map of Baltimore, Wm. Sides, Surveyor, Lith. by A. Hoen & Co. (Baltimore: Richard J. Matchett, 1852); Baltimore American, June 2, 5, 13 and July 6, 1860.

10. Gobright, Monumental City, 58; Sun, September 25, 1860; for park requests, see Sun, April 30, September 17, 1860; Baltimore American, June 19, July 17, 26 August 26, September 21, 24, 1860. Delays incurred by the onset of the Civil War and other factors postponed the opening of Federal Hill as a public park until 1879; see Baltimore Board of Park Commissioners, Public Parks of Baltimore: No. 1 Federal Hill ([s.l.]: [s.n.], 1927): 9. The Sun’s prediction was not borne out. As of 1887, Baltimore had 832 acres of parkland, one acre to every 439 inhabitants, well under the ratio in cities such as Boston (200), New York (374), Philadelphia (323), or Chicago (234); Providence Public Parks Association, Parks of the Leading Cities of this Country: Their Advantages (Providence: J.A. & R.A. Reid, 1887), 7.

Landscape and Politics . . . Druid Hill Park, 1860
Incorporate the Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, February described in the inspired the creation of a large park. American, January 17, March 13, 1860; Sun, June 8, July 2, 1860.

12. Mayor’s Message to the City Council, reprinted in the Sun, March 23, 1859.


15. Sun, March 23, 1859.

16. Sun, June 8, 1860 and July 2, 1860.


18. American, October 18, 20, 1860.


20. Mayor’s Message to the City Council, reprinted in the Sun, March 23, 1859.


22. Resolution No. 227, June 4, 1860, reprinted in Laws and Ordinances Relating to the Public Parks of the City of Baltimore, 7; occupational information for William E. Hooper, John Latrobe, and Robert Leslie is from the 1860 Woods’ Baltimore City Directory (Baltimore: John W. Woods, 1860), 188, 227, 232, 546. While there are two entries in the 1860 directory for Columbus O’Donnell (one of which identifies him as the Gas Company president), there is only one entry in 1859 for a man of this name, and this also places him in this occupation. Latrobe is identified as counsel for the B&O in the American, July 26, 1860. O’Donnell, it is worth noting, sold his large estate located to the southeast of Baltimore to the Canton Company, one of the world’s first industrial parks; Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 145.

23. Notice from the Office of the Public Park Commission, June 14, 1860, printed in the American, June 15.

24. Report of the Park Commissioners, reprinted in the American, July 25, 1860; also reprinted in abbreviated form in the Sun on the same day.


27. Daniels had competed with Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux in the Central Park design competition (and placed fourth), and had also designed a number of rural cemeteries and garden suburbs. Quote from Howard Daniels, “The Baltimore Park,” American, July 27, 1860; on Daniels, see Schuyler, The New Urban Landscape, 110–11;
Rosenzweig and Blackmar, *The Park and the People*, 118. For his part, Frederick Law Olmsted denigrated Daniels’s work on Druid Hill Park in a letter to his wife in 1877, “The scenery is very park-like, the trees charming—the work atrociously bad. So bad that I could do nothing with it. It is hopeless. Every bit of work has been done with ingeniously bad intention.” Olmsted is quoted in Schuyler, 215 n. 30.


30. Information on the construction of roadways through the park is available through the first several editions of the *Annual Report of the Park Commission to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore* (s.l.: s.n., 1860–1864). The quote and report of the promenade are from the fourth *Report*, 415.

31. These statistics were compiled from the second, third, and fourth *Annual Report of the Park Commission*. The Commission collected statistics from the Main Gate and from the Woodberry Gate, which served visitors from Baltimore County. Statistics on foot traffic from 1864 include both those who arrived at the park on foot and those who arrived by streetcar, as the streetcars were newly extended from the city line to the park’s gate.


33. All reprinted in the *American*, October 23, 29, 1860; see also October 25, 1860.


38. Ibid., quote on 29.


42. *Sun*, April 30, 1870; the judge in this case found that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to require African Americans to ride on the platform, and mandated the creation of comparable accommodations on the streetcars. These segregated cars, though, were themselves challenged and abandoned in 1871, when it was found that they were mostly filled with whites favoring the convenience of a second car over the principle of racial separation; see *Sun*, November 14, 1871.

43. The patterns of African American use of the park in the 1860s remain unknown.Druid Hill in the late nineteenth century was a site of racial mixing and contestation. In 1905, city authorities attempted to segregate the park, setting aside particular groves for blacks. The editor of the *Afro-American* protested that whites had acted so as to “let them feel that the great people’s play ground was not to be as free for them as for other people.”
protest from African American leaders, this decision was rescinded. John Murphy quoted in Michael Perman, Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888–1908 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 256.
44. Sun, March 23, 1859; Farrell, History of Baltimore’s Streetcars, 27.
46. American, July 9, October 20, 1860.
49. Inquirer, reprinted in the American, October 25, 1860.
51. The violence in these elections had been interpreted variously as the result of inadequate voting procedures and a tradition of public rowdiness, as a premeditated partisan tool employed to overcome organized state-level opposition and lackluster local support, and as a product of the flux in the two-party system caused by the Know-Nothings themselves. Baker, Ambivalent Americans, 120–24; Towers, “Violence as a Tool of Party Dominance,” 6–10; idem, “Ruffians on the Urban Border: Labor, Politics, and Race in Baltimore, 1850–1861” (PhD. Diss., University of California Irvine, 1993), 90–311, esp. 93–98; David Grimsted, American Mobbing, 1828–1861: Toward Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 242; Michael F. Holt, Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 173. See, for example, House of Delegates of the State of Maryland, Baltimore City Contested Election: Papers in the Contested Election Case from Baltimore City [1859], passim. Mayor Swann, responding to complaints about the unruliness of the elections, insisted that they were beyond his control and added that such problems as “undue crowding at the polls” were “evil[s] as old as the charter of your city.” Mayor’s Address to the People of Baltimore [19 September 1859?], Baltimore City Archives, Mayor’s Record Books, 1844–1859, RG9 S32 Box 594.
52. Sun, first quote July 25, 1860, second quote July 26, 1860.
53. Quote from the Sun, August 3, 1860; see also July 25, 26, September 20, October 4, 5, 1860.
54. Sun, August 3, 1860, October 4, 1860.
55. Sun, October 5 (first quote), 6, 8 (second quote), 10, 18, 20, 24, 1860; American, October 9, 1860.
56. American, September 11, 1860. Mayor Swann had criticized the press in similar terms
a year before, “I do not hesitate to say that the press has done more injury to this city than ten times the catalogue of rowdyism which it has professed to detail. It has . . . brought discredit to your good name abroad,” from “Mayor’s Address to the People of Baltimore,” 1859, Baltimore City Archives.

57. American, October 20, 25, 1860. Baltimore’s park advocates were not the only ones to stress this intercity aspect of park building; the Providence Public Parks Association fretted, “can Providence afford to be ‘less comfortable, less attractive, less healthy than her sister cities?’ Can she afford to be behind them all in those qualities that make cities rich, great, attractive, intelligent, and healthy?”; Parks of the Leading Cities of the Country, 49; see also John H. Rauch, Public Parks: Their Effects Upon the Moral, Physical and Sanitary Condition of the Inhabitants of Large Cities, with special reference to the City of Chicago (Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co.), 31 for Chicago; and Rosenzeig and Blackmar, The Park and the People, 22–25 for New York City.


59. The park inauguration was one of Swann’s last official duties as mayor. Although he did not stand for reelection in 1860, he did go on to have a long career in Maryland politics, first as governor (on the Unionist ticket) and later as a Democrat in the House of Representatives, Frank F. White, Jr., The Governors of Maryland, 1777–1970 (Baltimore: Twentieth Century Printing Co, 1970): 165–69.

60. All quotes from Thomas Swann’s inauguration speech, reprinted in the American, October 20, 1860.

61. Ibid.
Detail, A View of the Bombardment of Fort McHenry, Near Baltimore by the British Fleet, Taken from the Observatory, Under the Command of Admirals Cochrane & Cockburn, on the Morning of the 13th of Sepr. 1814. (Maryland Historical Society.)
H.M. Bomb Ship *Terror* and the Bombardment of Fort McHenry

Scott S. Sheads

For nearly two hundred years the traditional story of the Battle for Baltimore and that of the War of 1812 in Maryland has remained relatively consistent. The origins of the saga come from the pamphlets, journal articles, and lectures published in the years following the war, often based on misinterpretations of primary documents, oral histories passed down by the family fireside, or on secondary sources. In 1958, Franklin R. Mullaly produced the first in-depth scholarly research on the Battle for Baltimore, *The Battle of Baltimore, September 12 through September 14, 1814*. Mullaly’s research is the foundation of the National Park Service’s (NPS) interpretation of the Washington-Baltimore campaign of 1814. Recent scholarly investigations such as *The Star-Spangled Banner National Historic Trail Feasibility Study* (NPS, 2004) and the Smithsonian Institution’s *Saving the Star-Spangled Banner* preservation project (1998–2008) as well as the approach of the War of 1812 bicentennial highlight the need to take another look at the origins of Maryland’s war experience. A review of the primary documents associated with the Battle for Baltimore and Maryland has led to new discoveries and a re-interpretation of several important segments of the traditional story, the first of which is published here for the first time. Historians have traditionally believed that the bombardment of Fort McHenry started at 6:30 a.m. on September 13th, but a review of the logbook of H.M. Bomb Ship *Terror* and other supporting primary documents reveal what must be termed as a naval-range shelling began twenty-four hours earlier, on September 12th—seven hours before the Battle of North Point.

**H.M. Bomb Ship Terror**

In the early hours of Saturday, September 10, 1814, the H.M. Bomb ship *Terror*, under the command of Captain John Sheridan, entered the Chesapeake Bay. The *Terror*, newest of the Vesuvius-class vessels that Sir Henry Peake had designed at the Topsham Yards, England, joined as one of the additional bomb ships that Admiral John Borlase Warren had requested two years earlier “in case it is decided to annoy the coast of America.” Launched on June 29, 1813, the *Terror*’s vital specifications were 325 tons, 102 ft. length, 27 ft. beam, a 22.5 ft. depth with a crew of

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sixty-seven. In addition to the crew, the ship carried a detachment of the Royal Marine Artillery of twelve men who served each mortar. Unlike the earlier two-masted bomb ships, the **Terror**, designed as a full-rigged ship, had three masts. Technological advances in rigging, mast placement, ordnance, and structural design improvements had given way to the present Vesuvius class ship. Her forward standing rigging was made of chain to protect her from the muzzle blast of the two massive three-ton mortars on board. Her armament consisted of one ten-inch and one thirteen-inch-sea mortars, mounted on heavily reinforced, revolving centerline deck platforms. In addition, the **Terror** carried two six-pounder and eight twenty-four-pounder naval guns. *Niles Weekly Register* reported that with every mortar discharge the ship was “forced two feet into the water by the force of it, thus straining every part from stem to stern.” The imminent danger of carrying so many munitions and shells on board determined that a tender (a schooner or brig) carrying additional ammunition accompany each bomb ship or ketch.⁴

Baltimoreans already knew of the **Terror** and her role in the naval bombardment against Stonington, Connecticut, on August 9–10, 1814. Hezekiah Niles vividly described the British Navy depredations, including the episode in which the **Terror** had discharged 170 bomb shells at Stonington. There, according to poet Philip M. Freneau’s song *The Battle of Stonington*, “the bombs were thrown, the rockets flew” providing this New England coastal town with both a bombardment and an inspiration for a song before Baltimore and the nation would have its own “bomb bursting in air, the rockets red glare.”⁵ The **Terror**’s log hold the story of her activities during the bombardment of Fort McHenry the following month.

**September 11, 1814**

At 8:30 a.m., H.M. bomb ship **Terror** anchored “in 7 fathoms, furled sails [off] Swan’s Island” three miles above North Point in the bay to prepare in “getting ready for bombarding.”⁶ As a precaution, the bomb ships were kept separate from the remainder of the British troop ships and frigates anchoring off North Point’s Old Roads Bay while crews transferred munitions and bombs from the tenders.

At 11 a.m., the thirty-eight-gun H.M. Frigate **Surprise** sent her “Cutter to buoy off the Channel in Baltimore [Patapsco] River” while other vessels did likewise. The buoys would safely guide the British bombardment squadron up the shallow river approach to Fort McHenry. At 1:45 p.m. the **Terror**’s logbook noted that she “made sail with **Surprise**, bear[ing] the admirals [Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Inglis Cochrane’s] Flag and 2 Brigs of War running up to Baltimore. At 3:40 [p.m.] anchored . . . Baltimore 2 1/2 miles.” On board the **Terror** her crew made final preparations by placing fuses and preparing water buckets on deck all in readiness for the attack on Fort McHenry.⁷
September 12

In the early morning hours of September 12, the British expeditionary naval and military forces under Major General Robert Ross landed and formed up in columns at North Point to begin their ten-mile-march to Baltimore. Vice-Admiral Alexander Cochrane continued to move the bombardment squadron of frigates “up to Abt. [about] four miles from the Fort to await the arrival of the Bombs.”

The squadron came to anchor off Bear Creek in order to open a second line of communication and supply to the army as it advanced northward. At midnight the squadron’s small boats commenced “rowing guard” along the shore, creating a buffer safety zone between the shoreline and the British ships.

The Terror now moved closer to Fort McHenry, in effect a naval skirmisher, to check the range of the American shore batteries as well as her own, while the bombardment squadron also took position. The squadron consisted of H.M. Frigates Surprise, Madagascar, Severn, Havanna, Euryalus, Hebrus, H.M. Schooners Seahorse, Cockchafer, Woverine, and Rover; H.M. Brig Fairy, H.M. Rocket Ship Erebus, and the bomb ships Meteor, Devastation, Aetna, and Volcano. An account of the first shells fired at Fort McHenry is entered in the Terror’s log:

At 6 [a.m.] weighed & made sail, closer in – fired several shells, at the Battery off Baltimore. HMS Aetna, Volcano, Devastation & Meteor in Co[mpany].


None of the other bomb ships or frigates logs record any entries of shelling until the following morning, September 13th. Viewing the approach of the Terror and other ships, Sailing Master Beverly Diggs of the U.S. Chesapeake Flotilla in command of U.S. Barge No. 7, one of several defending the narrow passage between the Lazaretto and Fort McHenry, gave this report:

that the Enemy had taken distance below Fort McHenry with his Bomb Ships & other vessels of War and was about to commence the bombardment as if to reduce the Fort thereby, or to cover by the bombardment the passage of the other vessels of War by Fort McHenry; that about this time orders were received that the Barges proceed to the Wharves & take Such vessels as were ballasted and could easily be Sunk without regards to whom the[y] might belong, and to sink them in the River between Fort McHenry & the Lazaretto . . . The enemy having their Bomb ships moored & Commencing the Bombardment.

That the sinking of the vessels began to take place on the morning of September 12 is further verified in Sailing Master George De La Roche’s notebook. As acting commander of the U.S. Sloop of War Erie he wrote, also on September 12,
“as our broadside was too light to withstand frigates, was ordered to bring the ship [Erie] near Baltre. [Baltimore] again. Began to sink ships in the channel." Additional confirmation is found in Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane’s letter to Major General Robert Ross, “The Enemy have been Sinking Ships Across their Harbour All day.” The position of the British ships below Fort McHenry, as recorded in the logs, indicates that on September 12 the Americans had little time to lose in sinking the merchant vessels to block the channel. The anchorage of H.M. Frigate Surprize off the mouth of Bear Creek, “a gun shot below the batteries of Baltimore,” allowed for the opportunity of quick communications passage with the army.\

Entries in the Terror’s log continue, “At 9 [a.m.] shifted our Berth in shore & commenced Bombarding off the Battery of Baltimore. The[y] fired at us occasionally.” Both sides continued to check the ranges of their own guns. The artillery fire from Fort McHenry’s upper and lower water batteries came from the French naval eighteen-and thirty-six pounders that the French Consul of Baltimore had loaned the fort in 1813. The Terror, however, remained out of the one-and-a-half mile range of the American guns. One newspaper correspondent, believed to be Hezekiah Niles, editor of the Niles Weekly Register, did record fragmentary notes on the day’s events under the subject heading:

Battle of Baltimore, 12th Sept 1814. Bombardment of Fort McHenry commenced about 7 o’clock [a.m.] and continued until 6 next morning . . .
American batteries fired but a few shot, which could not reach [the British ships] . . . one bomb pierced the centre of the flag.\

The almost insignificant mention of the flag raises an intriguing question. Could this have been Fort McHenry’s large 42 ft. x 30 ft. garrison flag, flown prior to the heavy weather that began early the next morning, September 13th, and forced its replacement with the smaller 17 ft. x 25 ft. storm flag? The evidence suggests that it is—the garrison flag on display at the Smithsonian’s Museum of American History certainly has a scar to prove it—in the center of the flag.

The log books of the eighty-gun H.M. Ship-of-the-Line Tonnant also records, “A.M. Calm and fine weather. . . . The Commander-in-Chief went on board HMS Surprize. At 8 [a.m.] Calm & Cloudy. Heard a heavy Cannonading.” They heard the cannonading five hours before the commencement of the action at the Battle of North Point. By early afternoon, the battle underway, an unknown militia soldier recounted the events of September 12, “The enemy had two nine pounders, besides which they are firing bombs and rockets. . . . The cannon are now firing I believe on their ships. We have a boom across the river, and the hulks were sunk yesterday to obstruct the channel.”

Although the British nine pounders refer to the land ordnance of the army, the mention of bombs is clearly those resounding from the harbor, four miles west
of the battlefield. The shelling of Fort McHenry continued that evening, confirmed through the log entries noting the seventy-four gun H.M. Ship-of-the-Line Albion anchored off North Point along with the Tonnant, “6:00 [p.m. weather] mod’t & Cloudy. Heard a heavy cannonading in the direction of Baltimore. At 7:00 [p.m.] Observed a conflagration in that direction. “ Shelling from the Terror’s massive mortars continued into the evening, “At 9 [p.m.] ceased firing. At 11 [p.m.] rec’d orders to commence [shelling] at one [a.m. the next morning, September 13].” The captain’s log on board H.M. Rocket ship Erebus recorded the weather as “Fresh breezes, dark and cloudy W[ether] with squalls at times.” In all, with two intermissions, the Terror continued shellling for twenty-two hours.17

September 13
By 6:30 a.m., other bomb ships had joined the Terror. On board the Volcano, Captain David Price, commanding the bombardment squadron, gave the signal for the combined bombardment of the American shore batteries guarding the harbor entrance. The range-shelling the Terror had begun on September 12 resumed. The ship’s final role in the Baltimore campaign is recorded in the logbook:

A.M. at 1 commenced firing and continued, till four. At 6 Recommenced, and rec[eived]d orders to fire occasionally. At 7 ans[wer]’d sign’l to discon-
The early departure of the *Terror* raises an intriguing question. Why had she been removed so early from the bombardment and ordered to North Point? At 9:30 a.m. on September 13, Vice-Admiral Cochrane on board the thirty-eight-gun H.M. Frigate *Surprise* informed Rear-Admiral George Cockburn who accompanied the land forces:

> It is impossible for the Ships to render you any assistance, the Town is so far retired within the Forts. It is for Colonel Brooke to consider under such circumstances whether he has Force sufficient to defeat so large a number as it [is] said the Enemy has collected; say 20,000 strong or even a less number & to take the Town; without this can be done it will be only throwing the Mens [land forces] lives away and prevent us from going upon other services.  

Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane, with his Captain of the Fleet Rear-Admiral Edward Codrington, both on board H.M.S. *Surprise*, had reached the same conclusion. Having received word earlier of Major General Robert Ross’s death before the battle of North Point the previous afternoon, and of the strongly fortified American defenses on the Baltimore heights of Hampstead Hill, both admirals questioned whether the army could successfully assault the redoubts without sustaining heavy losses. Admiral Codrington recorded a pessimistic note in his diary, “Heroism will do wonders certainly, and there is that still to look to; but I believe there is too much on hand even for that, and I wish the job were well over.”

Based on the waning outlook for any success at all, they now agreed to order the *Terror* and other vessels down river to cover the re-embarkation of the army at North Point. They now had to convince Colonel Arthur Brooke with the army, but communications took several hours time.

Four miles below the bombardment squadron anchored off of North Point, H.M.S. *Tonnant*’s captain noted in his log: “At 11 [a.m.] observed the Squadron coming further down the Patapsco.” It is clear that several of the ships had begun to move downriver, away from the bombardment squadron. The four other bomb ships continued their shelling. Midshipman Robert J. Barrett on board H.M. Frigate *Hebrus* observed:

> All this night the bombardment continued with unabated vigor; the hissing of rockets and the fiery shells glittered in the air, threatening destruction as
they fell; whilst to add solemnity to this scene of devastation, the rain fell in
torrents, the thunder broke in mighty peals after each flash of lightening that
for a moment illuminated the surrounding darkness.22

September 14
The Volcano and the remaining bombs weighed anchor between 8:00 and 9:00
a.m. and departed down the Patapsco River, anchoring at 11:30 a.m. off the Patapsco
Neck (North Point). It is evident that as the British troops began to assemble on
the beaches to await transport to their ships, American cavalry were harassing the
British rear guard. It is very likely the Terror, according to her own log book entry
was “to cover the re-embarking of the troops.”23 Following the embarkation of the
troops, the Terror weighed anchor at 5:00 p.m. and departed the Patapsco River,
thus ending her role initiating the first shots of the Battle for Baltimore.

The number of shells the Terror expended on Baltimore harbor is unknown,
but the Volcano’s log records 278 shells and four carcasses had been thrown in a
period of twenty-four hours since dawn on September 13. If we use the figure of
shells expended by the Volcano as a rounded estimate of 275 shells expended, then
multiply the number by five, a rough estimated total of 1,400 shells had been
thrown during the bombardment of Fort McHenry, approximately 133 tons. The
number agrees with Lieutenant Colonel George Armistead’s report. “During the
bombardment, which lasted 25 hours (with two slight intermissions) from the
best calculation I can make, from fifteen to eighteen hundred shells were thrown
by the enemy.”24

Solving the Puzzle
The first question that readers will raise is why hadn’t anyone noticed this discrep-
ancy in the story, the twenty-four hours vs. a forty-eight hour bombardment?
The answer may be clearer from the perspective of the participants. Like the mili-
tary land maneuvers, skirmishes were forwarded to observe and check firing ranges
before the main force committed.25 One ship, such as the Terror, firing would not
have attracted much notice, but five bomb ships, frigates and H.M. Rocket Ship
Erebus with its fiery thirty-two-pounder Congreve rockets, commenced all to-
gether on the morning of September 13 certainly gained attention. Why Major
Armistead did not mention the Terror’s preemptive range shelling is a question
that remains unanswered.

In October 1824, while on a tour of the United States, the Marquis de Lafayette
(1757–1834) visited Fort McHenry where the Old Defenders’ awaited his arrival. A
hoisting of the original Star-Spangled Banner heralded his entry, “its ample field
pierced by a bomb-shell.” His private secretary, Mr. Auguste Levasseur recorded
this passage, “Fort McHenry defended by a few citizen soldiers, saw before its
feeble walls the pride of an English fleet rendered vain, and the enemy obliged to retire disgracefully after a bombardment of 48 hours.”

Levasseur’s reference to “a bombardment of 48 hours” probably referred to details he heard from actual defenders who had gathered during this celebratory occasion. The secretary also spoke with John Stuart Skinner (1788–1851) the prisoner of war exchange agent who had accompanied Francis Scott Key on his mission.

As for why the now confirmed September 12 shelling is not recorded in logs other than those of the HMS Tonnant and Albion, was the on-board routine of ordinance and warfare so common as to be considered ordinary to many who lived at the time? Professor Andrew Lambert of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London offered this explanation. “After the withdrawal no-one cared overly about exactly how long the action lasted, so the earlier preparatory attack was simply left out, there was much else to explain, and it was not intended to deceive or misinform. I suspect these were ranging shots, and the full scale attack occurred to the schedule we have always accepted.”

The Terror, Devastation, and Aetna, with seven other vessels, remained in the Chesapeake that fall following the departure of the fleet. The ships served as a blockade squadron under Captain Robert Barrie during the subsequent campaigns on the Coan and Rappahannock Rivers in Virginia. They, too, departed before the onset of winter. The Terror and the Rocket Ship Erebus, which also bombarded Fort McHenry, ended their days of service more than three decades later. In 1848 the ships sailed with Captain Sir John Franklin on his last voyage through the Northwest Passage and lost their way in the ice-filled Victoria Strait—where both rest on the bottom to this day.
Notes

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1. The Mullaly report “The Battle of Baltimore” was issued on November 7, 1958, and published in the *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 54 (1959): 61–103 (hereinafter *MdHM*). The study, one of several undertaken, was part of the National Park Service’s Mission 66 Program (1956–1966) to upgrade the facilities and resource interpretation of Fort McHenry during the War of 1812.


3. Admiral John B. Warren to Admiralty Offices at Whitehall, August 10, 1812, Adm 1/4020, Public Record Office, London (hereinafter PRO); Chris Ware, *The Bomb Ship: Shore Bombardment Ships of the Age of Sail* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 64; Warren (1753–1822) was appointed to the North American Station on August 3, 1812, with the Halifax, Leeward Islands, and Jamaica squadrons under his command; Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane replaced him in March 1814.

4. Robert Wilkinson-Latham, *British Artillery on Land and Sea, 1790–1820* (London: David & Charles, 1973), 75–81. The Royal Marine Artillery was established on August 18, 1804. The shallow draft bomb ship functioned as a floating siege platform and carried the heaviest and most powerful destructive armament for ship to shore bombardment. Like other warships that carried conventional naval cannon, a bomb ship’s armament had to be precise in its range target capabilities, platform steadiness, and strict crew discipline. The shell room beneath each rotating mortar carriage bed contained 200 thirteen-inch and 200 ten-inch shells. Ware, *The Bomb Ship*, 64–67; *Niles Weekly Register*, September 24, 1814, 25; a thirteen-inch shell could attain with a 20 lb. powder charge a maximum firing range of 1,400 yards (2.39 miles) with a forty-five degree elevation and a mile-high flight time of thirty-one seconds from ship to shore target. The shell ignited, shattering the two-inch cast-iron fragments over the harbor batteries. Wilkinson-Latham, *British Artillery* 75–81.

5. *Niles Weekly Register*, September 10, 1814, 13; “A Dash at Stonington,” *Niles Weekly Register, Supplement to Volume 8*, 177–78. The Stonington flag that flew during the bombardment measured 9 ft. x 16 ft. and had sixteen stars and sixteen stripes; James Hammond Trumbull, *The Defense of Stonington* (Hartford, Connecticut, 1864), 36, 53; *Niles Weekly Register* November 5, 1814, 133. Niles picked up the song from *The Columbian* (New York), who likely first published it in October.

6. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. *Terror*, September 11, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO. Ship’s and captain’s log books are the official records of the vessel’s activities, including courses steered and speed made good, arrivals and departures, stores taken on board, sail maneuvers, engagements fought, the arrival of flag officers, time and weather, groundings, and other noteworthy occurrences. Many of these observations are repetitious and reflect the overall monotony of daily life on the water. Early nineteenth-century logs ran from noon to noon when the ship was at sea, believing that correct time could be maintained by determining the precise instant of local apparent noon through noting the sun’s high point in the sky. Thus, a reading
of the log books during the Baltimore campaign shows that clerks placed varying degrees of importance on events and actions.
7. Ship’s log book, HMS Surprize, September 11, 1814, ADM 53/1278, PRO; Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Terror, September 11, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO. Captain Sheridan entered the Royal Navy in 1795 as a midshipman and was commissioned a lieutenant-commander on November 27, 1810. It is under this commission that he commanded the Terror in 1814. On June 13, 1815, he attained the rank of captain and rear-admiral in 1862. “Accounts and Papers: Parliamentary Sessions, 1847–1848,” The Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Review (London: John Henry and James Parker, 1862), 113, 233–34.
10. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Terror, September 12, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO.
11. “Testimony of Captain Beverly Diggs as to the period when the vessels were sunk,” Third Auditors Report, August 9, 1832, on Expenses incurred by the City of Baltimore during the attack in September 1814. Third Auditors Report, U.S. Treasury, National Archives; Commodore John Rodgers gave the order to sink the ships on September 12th. Samuel Smith to Committee of Vigilance and Safety, September 11, 1814, Samuel Smith Papers, Library of Congress.
12. George De La Roche, “A Seaman’s Notebook: The Travels of Captain George De La Roche,” MdHM, Volume 42, December 1947), 26167. A letter from Baltimore dated September 13 further confirms the sinking of the ships on the 12th: “We have a boom across the river, and the hulks were sunk yesterday to obstruct the channel [Northwest Branch].” The Yankee (Boston), September 24, 1814; Cochrane to Ross, September 12, 1814. The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Volume 3, 273–74; Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Severn, September 13, 1814, ADM 51/2811, PRO. The Severn was the flagship of Rear Admiral George Cockburn, who was with the British army. Anchored nearby was not only H.M.S. Surprize but the American flag-of-truce vessel, the President, with Maryland attorney Francis Scott Key on board.
13. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Terror, September 12, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO; the French guns came from the French seventy-four-gun Ship-of-the line L’Eole that had been towed to Baltimore in 1808 via Annapolis having been nearly destroyed in a storm in the Atlantic in 1806.
14. The weather continued moderately hazy, unknown author, The Huntington Library, San Marino, California. The author believes this belonged to Hezekiah Niles (1777–1839), who served as a private in Captain Peter Pinney’s 27th Maryland Regiment. Although the regiment was present at the Battle of North Point, Niles remained with his press.
15. Ship’s log book, H.M.S. Tonnant, September 12, 1814, ADM 53/2901, PRO.
16. The Yankee (Boston), September 23, 1814.
17. Ship’s log book, H.M.S. Albion, September 12, 1814, George Cockburn Papers, MSS 18974, Reel 4, Containers 6–7, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. The conflagration observed was the great ropewalk of Jacob Shinnick situated in front of the American defense works at Hampstead Hill (Patterson Park), set afire by orders of General Smith; Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Terror, September 12, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO; Captain’s logbook, H.M.S. Erebus, Midnight, September 12, 1814, ADM 51/2401, PRO.
18. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Terror, September 13, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO.
21. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Tonnant, September 13, 1814, ADM 51/2901, PRO.
23. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Terror, September 15, 1814, ADM 51/2894, PRO.
24. Captain’s log book, H.M.S. Volcano, September 13–14, 1814, ADM 51/2954, PRO; 13-inch cast-iron = 190 lbs. x 1,400 shells = 264,000 lbs. = 133 tons of iron; Major George Armistead to Acting Secretary of War James Monroe, September 24, 1814, Niles Weekly Register, October 1, 1814.
28. Andrew Lambert, Professor of Naval History, Department of War Studies, King’s College London to Scott Sheads, July 18, 2008, email correspondence.